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China is a country of rapid social change and tremendous contextual variations. This dissertation 
examines how those societal conditions have formed and framed Chinese people’s marriage and 
family behaviors.  
Specifically, Chapter 2 reports on a surprising inverted U-shaped trend in age homogamy 
from 1960 to 2005. One plausible explanation is that intensified economic pressure and rising 
consumerism during the post-1990s reform era have acted to increase women’s desire to marry 
men who are more economically established, and thus usually older.  
Chapter 3 examines how marital behaviors of a unique Chinese Muslim group – Hui – 
respond to varying conditions of local ethnic marriage markets. Results show that in places with 
higher Hui concentrations, Hui tend to have higher marriage rates, marry earlier and marry more 
endogamously. Conditional on being married, the logged odds of exogamy over endogamy is 
significantly lower in places with higher Hui concentrations; nevertheless, the negative 
relationship between Hui concentration and the logged odds of exogamy over singleness only 
holds for women. This indicates the competition between the norm of universal marriage and the 
norm of endogamy. Moreover, while men are more responsive to the change in Hui 
concentrations, women are more strictly constrained by the norm of universal marriage than men 




Chapter 4 examines the gender-specific fertility effects on parents’ time use, income and 
subjective well-being. Using gender of the first child as an instrumental variable based on the 
regional exemptions to the one-child policy in China, we aim to establish the causal estimates of 
the fertility effects. Results show that with more children, fathers spend significantly more time 
working and less time taking care of family members. Mothers, on the other hand, report better 
subjective well-being. 
This dissertation contributes toward understanding of the contextual influences, temporal 
or regional, on individuals’ marriage and family behaviors, under a research setting of transition 
and diversity. Future directions for this line of research point to the incorporation of theories 









This dissertation consists of three papers on marriage and family in contemporary China. As a 
country of rapid social change and tremendous contextual variations, China provides a unique 
research setting to investigate the contextual influences, temporal or regional, on individual 
behaviors. This dissertation examines how China’s various societal conditions have formed and 
framed Chinese people’s marriage and family behaviors.  
The first paper reports on a study of trends in marital age homogamy in China from 1960 
to 2005 that uses data from the China 2005 1% Population Inter-census Survey (mini-census). 
Instead of a consistent increase in age homogamy, as expected, results show an inverted U-
shaped trend. One plausible explanation is that intensified economic pressure, rising 
consumerism, and a shrinking gender gap in education during the post-1990s reform era have 
acted to increase women’s desire to marry men who are more economically established, and thus 
usually older, than less financially secure men. We argue that age hypergamy maintains status 
hypergamy, a deeply rooted norm for couples in China. An auxiliary analysis based on the 
human capital model for earnings supports this interpretation. A continued trend in age 
hypergamy implies a future “marriage squeeze” for men of low socioeconomic status.  
The second paper examines how marital behaviors of Hui Muslims respond to varying 
conditions of local ethnic marriage markets. Specifically, we explore marriage patterns 
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indicating adherence to two Islamic norms: universal marriage and endogamy. We measure 
marriage market conditions by local concentrations of Hui and estimate discrete-time hazard 
models of marital outcomes using data from the China 2005 mini-census. Results show that in 
places with higher Hui concentrations, Hui tend to have higher marriage rates, marry earlier and 
marry more endogamously. Conditional on being married, the logged odds of exogamy over 
endogamy is significantly lower in places with higher Hui concentrations; nevertheless, if we put 
exogamy as an alternative to being single, coefficient on the logged odds of exogamy over 
singleness is only significantly negative for women. This indicates the coexistence of and the 
competition between the two norms. Moreover, women have consistently higher marriage rates 
than men, regardless of the level of Hui concentrations. This indicates that women are 
constrained more strictly by the norm of universal marriage than men on a global basis. However, 
men are more responsive to the change in Hui concentrations with their larger variation in 
marriage rates. Men and women are equally restricted by the norm of endogamy.  
The third paper establishes causal estimates of the fertility effects on a variety of 
outcomes. “Motherhood penalty” and “fatherhood premium” regarding labor market outcomes 
have been established by an array of empirical studies. However, validity of the fertility effects 
has been controversial due to the potential selection bias. Moreover, fertility effects on subjective 
outcomes are also crucial while receiving limited attention. China’s exemption policy to the one-
child policy that couples whose first child is a girl can have a second child makes gender of the 
first child a powerful instrumental variable (IV). Based on the IV approach, this paper examines 
the gender-specific fertility effects on parents’ time use, income and subjective well-being 
outcomes, using the nationally-representative 2010 Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS). 
3 
 
Results show that with more children, fathers spend significantly more time working and less 
time taking care of family members. Mothers, on the other hand, report better subjective well-








Marital Age Homogamy in China: A Reversal of Trend in the Reform Era?1 
2.1 Introduction 
Social homogamy, or marriage between individuals with similar social characteristics (Burgess 
and Wallin, 1943),  is a common practice in many societies. In the literature on marriage and 
social stratification, an increase in homogamy based on such attributes as socioeconomic status, 
education, and race/ethnicity is generally considered an indicator of declining social openness 
and increasing social inequality (Harris and Ono, 2005; Kalmijn, 1991, 1998; Mare, 1991; Mare 
and Schwartz, 2006; Raymo and Xie, 2000; Schwartz, 2010; Schwartz and Mare, 2005; Smits, 
Ultee, and Lammers, 1998; Torche, 2010; Zijdeman and Maas, 2010).  
Another form of homogamy is age homogamy, or marriage between individuals of 
similar ages. The level of age homogamy is also an important indicator of social closure and 
gender inequality, as large age differences between spouses have been associated with more 
patriarchal family systems and less spousal intimacy (Blossfeld, 2009; Shorter, 1977; Van de 
Putte et al., 2009; Van Poppel et al., 2001). However, this type of homogamy has received less 
attention among researchers than social homogamy based on the aforementioned attributes. 
While the literature includes several studies of age homogamy (e.g., Atkinson and Glass, 1985; 
                                                            
1 Chapter 2 is co-authored with Yu Xie. 
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Esteve, Cortina, and Cabré, 2009; Van de Putte et al., 2009; Van Poppel et al., 2001), none deals 
with a long-term trend in contemporary China, particularly reform-era China.   
This study analyzes trends in age homogamy in China between 1960 and 2005, using 
indicators based on Schoen’s forces of attraction (Esteve et al., 2009; Qian and Preston, 1993; 
Schoen, 1981, 1988) and data from the nationally representative China 2005 1% Population 
Inter-census Survey (or the 2005 mini-census). Instead of a consistent increase in age 
homogamy, as one might expect from the literature, we found an inverted U-shaped trend over 
the period. One plausible explanation is that intensified economic pressure, rising consumerism, 
and a shrinking gender gap in education during the post-1990s reform era have acted to increase 
women’s desire to marry men who are more economically established, and thus often older than 
their less financially secure counterparts. Age hypergamy acts to maintain status hypergamy, a 
deeply rooted value for couples in China. 
 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Age homogamy and economic development  
A large literature in sociology has explored trends in social homogamy (Atkinson and Glass, 
1985; Esteve et al., 2009; Han, 2010; Kalmijn, 1991, 1993, 1998; Mare, 1991; Qian, 1997; Qian 
and Lichter, 2007; Raymo and Xie, 2000; Schwartz and Mare, 2005; Song, 2009; Van de Putte et 
al., 2009; Van Poppel et al., 2001; Zijdeman and Maas, 2010). Whereas homogamy in other 
social attributes reveals inequality and social closure, age homogamy is indicative of gender 
equality and social openness (Casterline, Williams, and McDonalds, 1986; Shorter, 1977; Van 
Poppel et al., 2001; Wheeler and Gunter, 1987). A few studies have found either an increase or 
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no clear trend in age homogamy with economic development (Atkinson and Glass, 1985; 
Casterline, Qian, and Liu, 2010; Esteve et al., 2009; Qian, 1998; Van de Putte et al., 2009; Van 
Poppel et al., 2001).2 
Age homogamy may increase with economic development for several reasons. While 
practices have varied across populations and periods, the traditional family in pre-industrial 
societies is characterized by a relatively large age gap between an older breadwinner husband 
and a younger wife with limited nondomestic labor participation (Van Poppel et al., 2001). This 
pattern of large age gap supports the patriarchal family system by reinforcing the husband’s 
authority and impeding spousal intimacy (Barbieri, Hertrich, and Grieve, 2005; Cain, 1993; Van 
Poppel et al., 2001). However, with greater industrialization comes an expansion in women’s 
economic roles outside the home and generally a narrowing of the age gap between husbands 
and wives. In this context, increasing age homogamy is taken to indicate a concomitant rise in 
gender equality and love-based (as opposed to necessity-based) marriages (Bozon, 1991; Van de 
Putte et al., 2009; Van Poppel et al., 2001).   
Kalmijn’s (1991, 1998) general framework for explaining social homogamy offers a 
rationale for why the spousal age gap is affected by social development. Within Kalmijn’s 
framework are three sets of explanatory factors : (1) the preferences of marriage candidates, (2) 
the impact of “third parties” (e.g., marriage candidates’ parents), and (3) the interaction 
                                                            
2 We are aware that there are some empirical literatures showing no clear trend in age homogamy. However, we will 
make no further discussion on this finding. The reasons are two-folds: first, literatures of this kind are highly limited 
in number and are subject to very restrictive social or temporal contexts. Therefore, findings of no clear trend are 
mostly made as auxiliary results aside from the main findings. Secondly, none of the literatures provide theoretical 
explanations on this kind of findings and left them as empirical inconsistencies.  
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structures of the marriage market. All three factors are affected in favor of age homogamy by the 
process of economic development (Raymo and Iwasawa, 2005; Smits et al., 1998; Song, 2009).   
By “preference,” social researchers commonly mean individuals’ choices free of 
structural constraints and motivated by their own social values and beliefs. Marriage is a social 
institution that binds two persons together in an intimate living relationship. Of course, people 
may get married for different reasons: some to complete an economic exchange, some out of  
family or even national interests, and some for romantic love. As a society changes from 
agricultural to industrial, however, romance becomes increasingly the accepted and even 
predominant basis for marriage due to the less necessity and desire for economic-exchange 
marriages and also due to more opportunities for the young adults to interact (Blossfeld and 
Timm, 2003; Thornton and Lin, 1994; Xu and Whyte, 1990). Admittedly, persons of different 
ages can and do form strong bonds based on romantic love, but romance is most likely to 
develop when partners interact directly and are similar in such characteristics as age, culture, 
tastes and physical conditions (Bhrolchain, 1992; Van Poppel et al., 2001). Thus, a shift to a 
love-based mate-selection norm is more likely to lead to smaller age differences (Bozon, 1991; 
Van Poppel et al., 2001; Wheeler and Gunter, 1987).   
Regarding the second set of factors, it is well established that as a society becomes 
industrialized, individuals depend less on parents or other authority figures (“third parties”) in 
their decisions about family-related behaviors – including marriage (Barbieri et al., 2005; Goode, 
1970; Thornton, 2001; Thornton, Axinn, and Xie, 2007; Thornton and Lin, 1994; Xu and Whyte, 
1990). When young adults are left on their own to choose potential spouses, they select from 
those whom they know best – most likely age peers – and these marriages reduce the overall 
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spousal age gap (Bozon, 1991; Casterline et al., 1986; Van Poppel et al., 2001; Wheeler and 
Gunter, 1987).    
Along with personal preference and the impact of the third parties, age homogamy can 
also be affected by the structure of the marriage market, which itself may be affected by 
economic development (Atkinson and Glass, 1985; Bhrolchain, 1992; Bytheway, 1981; Kalmijn, 
1991, 1998; Lichter, Anderson, and Hayward, 1995; Stier and Shavit, 1994; Todd, Billari, and 
Simão 2005; Vera, Berardo, and Berardo, 1985). With development, educational attainment 
generally increases. As a result, youths spend an increasingly large fraction of their pre-marital 
years in school, resulting in a much higher probability of individuals finding spouses among their 
schoolmates. This may be especially true for those receiving higher education, as the timing for 
pursuing postsecondary education usually parallels that for selecting marriage partners. 
Therefore, lengthened education completion may transform postsecondary institutions into 
important marriage markets and thus may increase the incidence of age homogamy (Blossfeld 
and Timm, 2003; Mare, 1991). 
For the reasons above, a consensus has emerged in the literature that economic 
development generally leads to a rise in age homogamy. This prevailing theoretical view is 
supported by empirical evidence from a variety of countries. For example, Casterline et al. 
(2010) report that during the past three decades 17 of 24 low-income countries under study 
experienced an increase in low-age-gap marriages with a gap of 0-5 years (0 and 5 included). 
The increases ranged from 0.2% for Peru between 1977 and 2004 to 20.5% for Ghana between 
1979 and 2008. Wealthier countries experienced similar increases in low-age-gap marriages with 
growing development. For example, U.S. marriages with 0 to 4-year spousal age gaps (4 
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included) increased from 37.1% in 1900 to 63.3% in 1960 and 69.9% in 1980 (Atkinson and 
Glass, 1985). The percentage of marriages with age gaps of less than two years (two excluded) 
rose by 7%-20% for the Dutch regions between 1812 and 1913 (Van de Putte et al., 2009). The 
proportion of marriages with 0 to 5-year age gaps (5 included) increased from 35% in the mid-
nineteenth century to more than 50% in the 1970s and early 1980s for the Netherlands (Van 
Poppel et al., 2001), and from 36% to 49% in Spain, 1944–2000 (Esteve et al., 2009).  
Thus, previous studies all indicate a decline in the age gap between spouses, particularly 
during periods of development. Is this generalization universal? Specifically, does it hold true for 
China in its recent past? We will answer these questions in the remainder of our paper.  
 
2.2.2 The Chinese context  
The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949 after the Communist Revolution. For the 
first 30 years, employment opportunities, consumption, and even family life in China were 
largely regulated by the state, and the Communist ideology regarding equality prevailed 
(Meisner, 1999; Parish, 1981; Whyte, 2010; Yu and Xie 2013). In 1978, China began its 
economic reform, leading to dramatic improvements in economic and educational outcomes 
(Hauser and Xie, 2005; Qian, 2000; Whyte, 2010; Xie and Hannum, 1996). For example, from 
1978 to 2005, China’s per capita GDP grew from 381 yuan to 2,062 inflation-adjusted yuan, 
averaging an annual growth rate of 6.45% (China Statistics Press 2006: Table 3-1, 3-17). In 
terms of education, from 1978 to 2005, the proportion of population enrolled in postsecondary 
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institutions grew from 0.09% to 1.19% (China Statistics Press 2006: Table 4-1, 21-6),3 while 
from 1982 to 2005, the illiteracy rate dropped tremendously from 31.87% to 11.04%4 (China 
Statistics Press 1985: Table 6 of the Third Census Document; 2006: Table 4-13). For persons 
aged 25-29, the age range in which marriage usually occurs, the percentage completing 
postsecondary education grew dramatically from 1.04% in 1982 to 12.66% in 2005 (China Data 
Center 1982: Table 5-48; 2005: Table 4-1). 
Since the Communist Revolution in 1949, women’s social standing in China has 
improved significantly (Hannum, 2005; Lavely et al., 1990; Song, 2009; Zhang, Hannum, and 
Wang, 2008). The 1950 Marriage Law formally legalized free-choice marriages and explicitly 
protected wives’ rights and interests, making them equal to those of husbands (China 
Administration Council 1950: Item 5). Women’s educational attainment has gradually caught up 
with that of men (Treiman, 2013; Wu and Song, 2010: Table 2; Wu and Zhang, 2010). For 
instance, in 1982, 1.24% of men and 0.64% of women had postsecondary education – rates that 
grew respectively to 6.72% and 5.63% in 2005, narrowing men’s advantage from about 100% to 
only about 20% (China Data Center 1982: Table 5-46; 2005: Table 4-1). 
 In general, increases in women’s social status has challenged status hypergamy – the 
tendency of women to marry men of higher social status – which is an indigenous practice in 
China and other East Asian countries (Baker, 1979; Croll, 1981; Dasgupta, Ebenstein, and 
Sharygin, 2010; Fan and Li, 2002; Freedman, 1970; Meijer, 1971; Raymo, 2003; Raymo and 
                                                            
3 All percentages completing postsecondary education in this sentence and in the next paragraph were computed as 
ratio of population completing postsecondary education over that receiving any education, due to data availability. 
4 The base for the 1982 illiteracy rate is population 12 years and older, and that for the 2005 illiteracy rate is 
population 15 years and older. This comparison gives us a conservative evaluation of the drop in illiteracy. 
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Iwasawa, 2005; Watson and Ebrey, 1991; Xu, Ji, and Tung, 2000; Yang, 1959). Chinese society 
has historically maintained a patriarchal and patrilineal family system (Thornton and Lin, 1994; 
Xu et al., 2000). Since women had limited access to work outside their households, a woman’s 
social status was determined by that of her parents before marriage and by that of her husband 
after marriage. Under this rigid patriarchal system, the man customarily assumed the role of 
primary breadwinner, which meant that his socioeconomic status was higher than that of his 
wife. Thus, status hypergamy has long been a prevalent cultural norm in Chinese society. Along 
with women’s improved social status, the practice of status hypergamy may have been eroded to 
some extent.  
These recent and dramatic social changes in China – increasingly free choice in mate 
selection, improved economic well-being, and women’s rising social status – provide a highly 
relevant context in which to analyze trends in age homogamy. The literature suggests that these 
social changes should all have led to increasing age homogamy for contemporary China. But has 
this been the case? We will answer this empirical question in the remainder of our paper.   
 
2.3 Data and methods 
This study uses both descriptive statistics and homogamy indicators based on “forces of 
attraction” (Esteve et al., 2009; Qian and Preston, 1993) to analyze age homogamy trends. To 
examine the robustness of the descriptive results, we also apply log-multiplicative layer effect 
models using year of marriage as the layer variable. Due to space limitation, we do not report all 
the results.5 We use data from China 1% Population Inter-census (or the 2005 mini-census). 
                                                            
5 Results using log-multiplicative layer effect models are posted on the author’s website. 
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2.3.1 Analytical samples 
We first restrict our analysis to individuals aged 15 and older to exclude those ineligible for 
marriage. Next, to compute forces of attraction, we construct for each study year two 
subsamples: one of single individuals who have never been married, and the other of couples. 
Constructing these subsamples retrospectively from 2005 data, we must account for women’s 
lower mortality than men’s (Yaukey, Anderton, and Lundquist, 2007), which could result in 
significant underestimation of spousal age gaps for earlier marriage cohorts. Hence, we restrict 
our analyses of both singles and couples subsamples to the period 1960-2005, rather than the 
period 1929-2005, the years covered in the original dataset.  
For the singles subsample, we set the marriageable age range at 15 to 50 for each 
marriage cohort. Note that we need to construct for each marriage cohort a pool of single persons 
at risk for marrying, including those who were married later. Therefore, this reconstructed 
subsample of “singles” includes all persons aged 15 to 95 in 2005 who were either married at 
some point after 1960 or still single in 2005. These restrictions leave us with a total of 1,880,015 
in the singles subsample: 947,324 males and 932,691 females.  
For the couples subsample, we restrict the data to couples in which both partners were 
married for the first time that year, forming the marriage cohorts. These restrictions result in a 
total of 459,721 couples in marriage cohorts between 1960 and 2005. We use this larger couples 
sample for descriptive analyses and log-multiplicative layer effect models. However, to compute 
homogamy indicators based on forces of attraction, we further restrict the sample to couples in 
which both spouses were 15 to 50 years of age, the assumed marriageable age range, reducing 
the total to 459,291 couples.   
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We are aware that the actual mate-selection process cannot be determined by a single 
person but requires the cooperation of two marriage partners and often their families as well. 
That is, individual partners must be jointly involved in making a decision to get married. As 
described above, our analytical sample is based on observed marriages. For this reason, our data 
pertain to actually contracted marriages and thus cannot reveal individuals’ latent preferences or 
processes that led to the marriages. However, to achieve our objective of understanding trends 
in age homogamy in China’s recent past, observed information about husbands and wives in 
contracted marriages is actually what we want. One advantage of our reduced-form approach is 
that our indicators of homogamy can be easily constructed from retrospective data and are 
comparable over time. 
From the 2005 mini-census data, we reconstruct, retrospectively, the experiences of 
marriage cohorts. Because only age at first marriage is included in the dataset, we restrict our 
analyses to first marriages, which may introduce a bias into our study. Past studies on trends in 
homogamy have relied on repeated cross-sectional data on recently contracted marriages or 
newlyweds to avoid bias from selective marital dissolution or remarriage (e.g., Kalmijn, 1994; 
Mare, 1991; Qian, 1998; Qian and Preston, 1993; Raymo and Xie, 2000; Schwartz and Mare, 
2005). However, given the very low divorce rates in China throughout this period, 6 we do not 
anticipate a severe problem in our sample, though it is still useful to speculate on the direction of 
such biases. As many scholars of marriage have argued, larger spousal age differences often 
predicts higher risks of divorce (Bumpass and Sweet, 1972; Day, 1964; Levinger, 1976; Wilson 
and Smallwood, 2008), and marriages of higher parity tend to have larger spousal age gaps 
                                                            
6 Divorce rates range from as low as 0.035% in 1980 to as high as 0.137% in 2005 (China Statistics Press, 2006). 
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(Atkinson and Glass, 1985; Bhrolchain, 1992; Dean and Gurak, 1978; Vera et al., 1985). Given 
the rise in divorce rates during the study period, our focus on first marriages is likely to exert an 
upward bias on trends in age homogamy, especially for more recent periods. 
Our exclusion of couples in which one or both partners is a remarried widow/widower 
may also affect the results. Although widows used to be discouraged from remarriage due to 
China’s traditional emphasis on female chastity (Campbell and Lee, 2002; Marriage and Family 
Encyclopedia, 2009), widow remarriage has become more common in contemporary China with 
advancements in women’s social status and individual rights. This change, combined with the 
positive link between marriage parity and spousal age gaps, means the exclusion of remarried 
widows should also lead to an increasing upward bias in age homogamy. 
Additionally, given the cross-sectional nature of the 2005 mini-census dataset, a majority 
of the younger individuals in 2005 may not yet have completed their mate selection process, 
suggesting our couples sample of the recent marriage cohort may have a disproportionately high 
proportion of younger-age marriages. According to the literature, younger-age marriages are 
characterized by smaller age gaps than later-age marriages (Qian, 1998; Van Poppel et al., 2001). 
Hence, we may find an overestimation for age homogamy in more recent marriage cohorts. In a 
later section, we will discuss these potential influences with regard to specific results. 
  
2.3.2 Homogamy indicators 
The concept of force of attraction was first introduced by Schoen (1981, 1988). It is a special 
type of marriage rate based on the harmonic mean of single males and females – that is, those at 
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risk for marriage – for each spousal age combination. The mathematical formula of force of 
attraction is: 







H n W n
 

      ,                  (1) 
in which ijm indicates the number of marriages between males aged i  and females aged j ; 
i and j are both age intervals; n is length of the intervals and varies with the definition of age 
homogamy; iH and jW respectively identify the number of eligible males at age i  and that of 
eligible females at age j . In this formula, the number of marriages that are actually contracted is 
considered along with the amount of potential exposure between eligible males aged i and 
females aged j . Thus, the entire population at risk for marriage is taken into account (Blossfeld 
and Timm, 2003). Compared to investigations of only prevailing marriages, our analysis controls 
for changes in age-sex composition of the marriage market.  
For each marriage cohort, we calculate a homogamy indicator based on forces of 
attraction (Esteve et al., 2009), which is the ratio of sum of forces of attraction ( ij as defined in 
Equation (1)) where i equals j , over the sum of all forces of attraction. This indicator reflects the 
strength of preferences for age homogamy over the overall distribution of couples. It ranges from 
0 to 1, with higher values indicating stronger preferences for age homogamy. 
We construct forces of attraction and homogamy indicators respectively with single-year, 
three-year, and five-year age-gap groups. As Van Poppel and colleagues (2001) demonstrated, 
dividing age at marriage into groups with mandatorily determined boundaries and widths can 
only identify level of heterogamy with relatively large spousal age gaps and thus may produce 
16 
 
inaccurate results. Furthermore, this approach may classify some marriages with a small age gap 
(e.g., husband marrying at 35 and wife at 34) as heterogamy, while classifying others with a 
large age gap (husband marrying at 34 and wife at 30) as homogamy. Therefore, experimenting 
with changing age groupings enables us to mitigate the negative impact of categorization by 
observing robustness of the results. These different groupings can also provide levels of age 
homogamy based on definitions of varying strictness. While homogamy indicators with single-
year age groups define age homogamy in the most conservative sense, those with five-year age 
groups provide a much more liberal definition.  
 
2.3.3 Marriage cohorts and birth cohorts 
Globally, the distribution of average age at marriage by gender differs by marriage cohorts and 
birth cohorts. In the Chinese case, the average age at marriage increased from 1960 to 2005. This 
trend and related confounding factors may distort trends in age homogamy over marriage 
cohorts. To confirm our results based on marriage cohorts, we examine patterns in age 
homogamy by birth cohort and gender.7 A methodological difficulty is that some of the single 
persons in the most recent birth cohorts had yet to enter marriage by 2005. Analyses of married 
couples in these birth cohorts are likely to underestimate not only average age at marriage, but 
also spousal age gaps,  since earlier marriages tend to be more age homogamous (Qian, 1998; 
Van Poppel et al., 2001). 
Our solution in addressing this censoring problem is to find, for each birth cohort and for 
men and women respectively, the median age at first marriage – in this case, the age at which 
                                                            
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this suggestion.   
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half of the birth cohort population married. We then compute descriptive measures of age 
homogamy for each birth cohort, separately by gender, for those individuals who married for the 
first time at the median age. By focusing on the trends in age homogamy for persons married at 
the birth-cohort-specific median ages, we are able to observe patterns in age homogamy that are 
representative of different birth cohorts. Moreover, due to the mortality attrition of the older 
population, patterns for those older birth cohorts may not be reliable. Therefore, we present 
trends of birth cohorts only for 1940 or later for men, and 1941 or later for women. Initial 
analyses showed that the median ages of first marriage steadily increased in our sample, from 24 




2.4.1 Trend in marital age homogamy 
[Figure 2.1 about here] 
Figure 2.1 presents results on trends in age homogamy using measures of 0, 1, 3, and 5-year 
spousal age gaps (husband’s age minus wife’s age), by marriage cohorts. The bottom line shows 
proportions of couples with no age gap – the most conservative definition of age homogamy. The 
next three lines above show proportions of couples with an age gap of, respectively, 0 to 1 year, 
0 to 3 years, and -1 to 4 years. The four lines depict a very similar trend: rather than a consistent 
increase in age homogamy, as expected from the literature, all four lines show increases in 
homogamy for marriage cohorts prior to 1990 and decreases thereafter.  
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We obtain a similar inverted U-shaped trend in our analyses using homogamy indicators 
by forces of attraction. This analysis is not a repetition of those shown in Figure 2.1. By using 
homogamy indicators, we can evaluate underlying preferences for age homogamy while 
controlling for the confounding influence of the age-sex composition of the marriage market. 
Appendix Tables 2.1 to 2.3 provide homogamy indicators based on age groupings of a single 
year (e.g., ages 20 and 21), 3 years (e.g., ages 20-22 and 23-25), and 5 years (e.g., ages 20-24 
and 25-29), respectively. As can be seen from these results, the inverted U-shaped trend in age 
homogamy holds true for all three age groupings and for varying methods of computing moving 
averages. This analysis also shows increasing age homogamy among marriage cohorts up until 
the early 1990s, and decreases thereafter. 
 [Figure 2.2 about here] 
To observe the trends more clearly, we computed moving averages for the three age 
groupings of homogamy indicators, with equal and varying weights for the adjacent three, five, 
seven, nine and eleven marriage cohorts. Among the three sets of homogamy indicators, the 
trend based on the three-year age groups is especially sharp, and Figure 2.2 presents two trends 
for this set – one for raw homogamy indicators and one for moving averages for the adjacent 
seven marriage cohorts with equal weights. As can be seen, the two trends are generally 
consistent with each other in spite of short-term fluctuations shown in the raw indicators. The 
trend based on moving averages is clear: From 1960 to the mid-1960s, age homogamy increased 
slightly; the trend was unstable between 1967 and 1976, around the period of the Cultural 
Revolution; it increased steadily from the mid- to late-1970s until the early 1990s, and then it 
began to decrease.  
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To further check our results, we also conduct analyses based on log-multiplicative layer 
effect models (Raymo and Xie, 2000) with varying design matrices. An inverted U-shaped trend 
is found for all the models used. 
[Figure 2.3 about here] 
Do we find similar inverted U trends in age homogamy if we examine birth cohorts 
instead of marriage cohorts?  In Figure 2.3, we show trends in age homogamy by birth cohorts 
for men and women who got married at the birth-cohort-specific median age at first marriage. 
For this figure, age homogamy is operationalized as a spousal age gap of 0 to 3 years (0 and 3 
included). As discussed above, this homogamy measure for those married at the median first-
marriage age obviates the methodological problems of the “right censoring” for the most recent 
birth cohorts. To make the trends smoother, we presented moving averages for the adjacent 
seven birth cohorts with equal weights. Here also we see inverted U-shaped trends for both men 
and women, with peaks occurring around the times suggested by results using marriage cohorts. 
Specifically, for men, the peak in age homogamy occurs at 74.97% for the 1968 birth cohort in 
1991 with a birth-cohort-specific median first-marriage age of 23; for women, the peak occurs at 
70.34% for the 1973 birth cohort in 1995 with a birth-cohort-specific median first-marriage age 
of 22. While men and women reached peaks in age homogamy in different years, the peaks both 
belonged to marriage cohorts post 1990, which was earlier shown by analysis based on marriage 
cohorts. Note that the trend for women lags behind that for men, reflecting the fact that women 
on average marry at a younger age than men do.  
Because, as discussed, our sample construction and restriction methods should lead to 
overestimation of age homogamy for more recent marriage/birth cohorts, we consider the 
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observed reversal of the upward trend in age homogamy after the early 1990s to be a 
conservative finding. That is, we expect the actual reversal to be even more pronounced.  
 
2.4.2 Hypogamy or hypergamy? 
The decline in age homogamy after the early 1990s may indicate a recent increase in age 
hypogamy (older women marrying younger men) and/or age hypergamy (younger women 
marrying older men). However, the theoretical implications of these two potential increases are 
quite different. While an increase in age hypogamy may indicate growth in liberal attitudes on 
gender relations and marriage, a rise in age hypergamy may reflect a shift toward conservative 
marriage values in which husbands have authority over wives. Therefore, distinguishing changes 
in either age hypogamy or age hypergamy could shed light on the underlying causes of the recent 
dip. 
[Figure 2.4 about here] 
Accordingly, we took the ratio of age hypergamy (percent of couples with a husband-
minus-wife age gap larger than three years, three excluded) to age hypogamy (percent of couples 
with a husband-minus-wife age gap smaller than zero years, zero excluded) for each marriage 
cohort. Figure 2.4 presents this trend in relative hypergamy prevalence for men and women by 
marriage cohort – depicting trend lines that look like a horizontal flip of those shown in Figures 
2.1 and 2.2. That is, the relative prevalence of age hypergamy to hypogamy decreased from 1960 
to the late 1980s, and increased from the early 1990s on. This result reveals the importance of 
age hypergamy in the recent decline in age homogamy in the post-1990s reform era.  
[Figure 2.5 about here] 
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Figure 2.5 shows trends in the relative hypergamy prevalence by birth cohort for men and 
women who got married at the birth-cohort-specific median age at first marriage. The trends 
presented are moving averages for the adjacent seven birth cohorts with equal weights, the same 
analytic approach used for results presented in Figure 2.3. The birth cohort trends in hypergamy 
depicted in Figure 2.5 reflect those for marriage cohorts in Figure 2.4, with declines among birth 
cohorts before 1965 and increases thereafter. Specifically, the bottom of trend for men occurs at 
0.55 for the 1968 birth cohort in 1991 with a birth-cohort-specific median age at first marriage of 
23; and the bottom for women occurs at 0.71 for the 1966 birth cohort in 1988 with a birth-
cohort-specific median age at first marriage of 22. Both of these lows occur in marriage cohorts 
around 1990. 
Confirming our interpretation of earlier results presented in Figures 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3, the 
pattern shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5 indicates a decrease in age homogamy and a related 
increase in relative age hypergamy since the early 1990s. What has driven this spousal age gap 
increase in post-1990s reform era China? The next section discusses a possible explanation. 
 
2.4.3 Economic pressure: an explanation for the reversal  
At first glance, the recent decreases in age homogamy, and corresponding increases in age 
hypergamy, are surprising given the widely held belief in a positive relationship between age 
homogamy and development. However, China’s reform era is a complex historical period 
characterized by shifting social processes, rapid economic growth, a sharp increase in standard of 
living, and, important to this analysis, a tremendous rise in consumer aspirations accompanied by 
increasingly severe market competition (Yu and Xie, 2013). In the pre-reform regime, almost all 
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domains of life, including employment, consumption, housing, and even family life, were largely 
regulated by the state in order to operationalize Communist egalitarian ideology. Consequently, 
inequality was low and economic expectations were highly limited. However, the reform has 
dramatically altered the context. In the course of economic growth, consumer aspirations have 
soared, leading to unrealistically high expectations regarding living standards and extremely 
strong economic pressures to realize these expectations (Davis, 2005). China’s gigantic 
population and limited resources have intensified these pressures. A particularly salient example 
can be found in the skyrocketing housing prices, especially in those more prosperous cities 
where more and better employment opportunities are available. For instance, for all of urban 
China, the average housing price increased from 315 Yuan per square meter in 1991 to 2,628 
Yuan per square meter in 2008 (Yu and Xie, 2013).  During the same period, Beijing, China’s 
capital, experienced an increase from 602 to 12,418 Yuan per square meter. As housing is often 
considered a prerequisite for household establishment, such rising housing prices have 
heightened economic expectations from marriage candidates and exerted increasing economic 
pressure on them (Yu and Xie, 2013) – pressure that may have affected age homogamy through 
several mechanisms.  
First, from the bride’s standpoint, increasingly severe competition within the labor 
market during the post-1990s reform era may have brought women back to a disadvantaged 
economic position. Some researchers (Summerfield, 1994; Zhang et al., 2008) have found that a 
narrow emphasis on short-term efficiency and profit-making among many companies during the 
most recent reform era have led to greater discrimination against women within the labor market. 
In recent years, women’s unemployment increased significantly (Summerfield, 1994; Wu and 
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Song, 2010: Table 2). Facing this new unfavorable labor market environment, many women may 
be involuntarily forced back into homemaker roles. In light of their downgraded role in the labor 
market and the fast-rising cost of living, marrying an affluent, socially successful husband has 
once again become an attractive channel for achieving a higher social status. Since older men are 
more likely than younger men to possess higher social status and greater economic potential, this 
may make the prospect of an older husband more appealing (Bozon, 1991).   
Second, from the groom’s standpoint, men now face increasingly fierce market 
competition and higher costs in establishing households in reform-era China. In addition, 
women’s lower economic potential and their concomitant higher interest in the economic 
prospects of men may increase pressure on men to act as breadwinners. Women’s enhanced 
educational profiles may further raise the pressure (Raymo and Iwasawa, 2005). That is, men 
have to compete in both the labor and the marriage markets, with competition ever more intense 
on both fronts. To become more attractive to women, then, men may need to wait longer to 
marry while accumulating resources (Smock and Manning, 1997; Thornton, Axinn, and 
Teachman, 1995; Xie et al., 2003).  
In short, while women may want to marry older men in response to their occupational 
downgrades, men may want to settle down later given the labor and marriage market competition 
they face. Thus, the same processes of reform that helped narrow spousal age gaps in the early 
years – by raising women’s socioeconomic status and promoting individual rights – may have 
contributed, since the early 1990s, to widening spousal age gaps via increased market 
competition and economic pressure. For convenience, we call this the “economic pressure” 
explanation of decreasing age homogamy. 
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Status hypergamy is a component of the economic pressure explanation. As discussed, 
the roots of status hypergamy lie very deep in China, where it was practiced nearly universally 
for many centuries (Thornton and Lin, 1994).  Although improved economic well-being and 
greater individualism during the initial stages of China’s development may have weakened this 
practice, heightened economic pressure could have revived it. Theoretically speaking, status 
hypergamy can be attained through a variety of channels. Women can marry up in terms of 
achieved traits such as education or occupation, or ascribed traits such as age, family origins, or 
race/ethnicity. Among these domains, age and education are especially important to status. Age 
is highly related to overall socioeconomic status, since older individuals are likely to have 
accumulated more and better cultural and social resources (Van Poppel et al., 2001). And 
education is well established as a predictor of status via its connection to socioeconomic 
positions (Hauser and Xie, 2005; Mare, 1991; Mincer, 1974; Schwartz and Mare, 2005; Xie and 
Hannum, 1996; Xu et al., 2000) and to family origins (Blossfeld and Timm, 2003; Lucas, 2001; 
Mare, 1991; Raftery and Hout, 1993). Hence, women wanting to improve their social status 
through marriage are likely to prefer men who are older and better educated than themselves. 
The increase in women’s educational attainment in the last half of the 20th century (Lavely et al., 
1990) led to a rapidly narrowing educational gender gap in China (Hannum, 2005; Treiman, 
2013; Wu and Zhang, 2010). Specifically, the ratio of spousal educational gap (husband’s minus 
wife’s years of schooling) to wives’ years of schooling has decreased from 0.28 in 1960 to 0.16 
in 1980, 0.10 in 1990 and 0.04 in 2005. Because the narrowing gender gap in education has 
made it increasingly difficult to practice status hypergamy with respect to education,8 couples 
                                                            
8 Although the educational gap also greatly narrowed in the pre-reform era, especially during the Cultural 
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may elect to achieve status hypergamy by means of age, whereby the older husband still 
maintains an economic advantage over his similarly educated but younger wife. Therefore, 
during the post-1990s reform era, the notion of “marrying up” may have reemerged with a 
different meaning: the husband tending to be older and economically better off than the wife, 
though not necessarily better educated.   
Given these marriage market processes, women on the “high-end” and men on the “low-
end” socioeconomically may find it particularly difficult to find suitable marriage partners 
(Raymo, 2003; Raymo and Iwasawa, 2005). However, given the overwhelming norm of 
universal marriage in China, these social pressures are likely to lead to delays in marriage, rather 
than non-marriages. Based on the 1982, 1990, 2000 and 2010 China census data, as well as the 
1995 and 2005 China mini-census data, the proportion never married by age 30 has been 
consistently low. Specifically, from 1982 to 2010, percentages never married are respectively 
5.17%, 4.89%, 4.34%, 4.51%, 4.49% and 4.99% for men, and 0.33%, 0.31%, 0.34%, 0.48%, 
0.57% and 1.21% for women (China Data Center 1982: Table 7-71; 1990: Table 7-5; 1995: 
Table 4-4; 2000: Table L5-03; 2005: Table 6-1; China Statistics Press 2010: Table L5-05). Thus, 
the poor men are likely to delay marriage to accumulate enough economic resources to attract a 
wife, and the highly educated and economically well off women are likely to marry significantly 
older men who would be better established than themselves – both of which result in even 
greater spousal age gaps. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Revolution, it did not reach parity (Hannum and Xie, 1994).  Status hypergamy is difficult to maintain only when 
the educational gap disappears.  In addition, economic factors became important for entry to marriage only in the 
post-reform period (Yu and Xie, 2013).  
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To test the economic pressure explanation, we conduct an auxiliary analysis based on a 
revised version of Mincer’s (1974) human capital model. In this analysis, we consider what 
possible role the narrowing gender gap in education may have played as a concrete causal 
mechanism for the economic pressure explanation. Because we do not have perfect data for this 
part, this analysis is intended mainly to demonstrate the relevance of this causal mechanism. The 
key idea is that, during the later stage of the economic reform and in the face of a decreasing 
educational gap by gender,9 age may have begun to substitute for education as a proxy for men’s 
higher status. To examine the effects of educational and age gaps on status hypergamy, we 
compare husbands’ earnings premiums by holding average educational attainment and average 
age at first marriage at different levels for each marriage cohort. Lacking historical data on 
couples’ earnings at the time of marriage, we instead use an estimation of their potential earnings 
through a revised version of Mincer’s (1974) human capital model, in which the estimated 
earnings of the year of marriage are based on the average educational attainment and years of 
work experience for each marriage cohort. Specifically, we use the following equation for each 
gender: 
0 1 1 2 2lnY X X       ,         (2) 
where Y is earnings, X1 years of schooling, and X2 years of work experience. All ’s are 
unknown parameters, and   is the residual unexplained by the model. Equation (2) deviates 
from Mincer’s model in that it does not include the quadratic term of years of work experience. 
                                                            
9 We are also aware that as higher education becomes more prevalent, postsecondary institutions may play an 
increasingly important role as locations for mate selection. Conducting the mate selection process in schools may 
lead to both educational and age homogamy. Under this circumstance, if the level of age homogamy still decreases 
in the post-1990s reform era, we can claim stronger evidence for the increasing expectation for men’s economic 
potential in mate selection. 
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This is reasonable given that we restrict the analysis to individuals 20 to 30 years old, the age 
range in which most marriages occur and work experience increases earnings steadily. Thus, 
inclusion of the quadratic term is not theoretically compelling and may result in a loss of 
precision and predictive power of the model.      
We use data from Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) 1988, 1995 and 2002 to 
estimate  ’s in Equation (2), respectively for marriage cohorts 1985-1991, 1992-1998 and 1999-
2005. We use data only for urban workers because personal earnings are ambiguous for rural 
residents in CHIP. Again, because our main objective here is illustrative, a systematic bias in the 
auxiliary analysis resulted from the restriction to urban workers should not invalidate the 
substantive conclusion. Given our specific purpose to estimate husbands’ earnings premiums, as 
well as the gender differential in returns to education and experience, we estimate Equation (2) 
separately for men and women. Combined with other criteria for excluding observations with 
missing or incomplete data, this procedure yields samples of  2,052 men and 2,321 women from 
CHIP 1988, 1,013 men and 1,060 women from CHIP 1995, and 640 men and 709 women from 
CHIP 2002. We capture all forms of income, including the provision of cash bonuses and 
subsidies. Earnings in 1995 and 2002 are adjusted by the appropriate price indices so that all 
analyses are comparable in 1988 Yuan (China Statistics Press, 2006). Following Xie and 
Hannum (1996), we recode education into years of schooling10 and calculate work experience as 
                                                            
10 Less than three years of schooling=1; three years of schooling but less than primary school=4; primary school=6; 
junior high=9; senior high=12; trade school=13; community/technical college=15; college and graduate school=17. 
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the difference between current age and age at first year of experience, which varies with 
education.11 
Once we obtain estimated  ’s, we apply average years of schooling and average age at 
first marriage for each marriage cohort using 2005 mini-census data to the regression equations 
to estimate earnings at the time of marriage. Here we extrapolate years of work experience from 
years of schooling and age at first marriage. We then estimate husbands’ earnings premiums as 
the ratio of husbands’ to wives’ earnings, by marriage cohort. To explicitly illustrate the role of 
increases in the spousal age gap in compensating for decreases in the educational gender gap, we 
construct four trends according to (1) whether education was fixed to the 1985 level or was 
allowed to change as it actually did, and (2) whether age at first marriage was fixed to the 1985 
level or was allowed to change as it actually did. The combination of these two specifications 
yields four trends for husbands’ earnings premiums, one observed and three hypothetical, which 
are based on: (a) observed average educational attainment and average age at first marriage; (b) 
observed average educational attainment, with average age at first marriage held at the 1985 
level; (c) observed average age at first marriage, with average educational attainment held at the 
1985 level; and (d) average educational attainment and age at first marriage both held at the 1985 
levels. The results are shown in Figure 2.6.   
[Figure 2.6 about here] 
As can be seen in Figure 2.6, trend (a) is interlaced with (b) until around 1995 and starts 
to diverge upward from (b) with increasing gaps thereafter. Meanwhile, trend (a) is interlaced 
                                                            
11 Specifically, the ages at first year of experience for each educational level are: primary school and lower=14; 




with (c) briefly during the earlier stages of the reform and then diverges downward around 1987, 
with increasing gaps. Both divergences point to the plausibility of spousal age gaps substituting 
for spousal educational gaps in status hypergamy. Specifically, with the shrinkage of educational 
gaps without a corresponding increase in age gaps between husbands and wives, status 
hypergamy, as reflected in husbands’ earnings premiums, cannot keep up with hypergamy based 
on the actual age and educational gaps, as shown by the comparison between (a) and (b). By the 
same respect, if female education had not increased as it has, the manner in which spousal age 
gap increases may lead to even higher husbands’ earnings premiums than those based on actual 
age and educational gaps, as shown by the comparison between (a) and (c). Furthermore, the 
husband’s earnings premiums shown in (d), which fixes both schooling and age at first marriage 
to 1985 averages, are generally lower than those in (c) but higher than those in (b). This result 
further demonstrates the overriding importance of spousal age gap relative to educational gap in 
the impact on status hypergamy. 
 
2.5 Conclusions and discussion 
This analysis of marital age homogamy in China from 1960 to 2005 reveals an inverted U-
shaped trend, whereby age homogamy increased until the early 1990s and then began to decline. 
The shrinking spousal age gap trend is not surprising in the period, given reform-era social, 
economic, and political developments. However, the recent trend toward increasing spousal age 
differences is unexpected and invites explanation. 
We tested the plausible “economic pressure” explanation that the post-1990s reform era 
environment – with its intensified labor market pressure, rising consumerism, and skyrocketing 
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costs of living – acted to promote marriages of older men to younger women on the basis of a 
need or preference for status hypergamy. Simply put, a renewed interest in status hypergamy is 
thought to be driven by men’s increasing economic pressures to support family consumption and 
women’s downgraded labor market prospects. In particular, given women’s educational 
advances in reform-era China, status hypergamy is more difficult to achieve among like-aged 
men and women, who may have similar educational attainment and be at similar career points. 
Our tests of the relative impact of age and education on status hypergamy support the premise 
that age has begun to substitute for education as a proxy for men’s higher status. In this sense, 
our analysis found the closing of the gender gap in educational attainment to also be a plausible 
causal mechanism of the reversal in age homogamy in the post-1990s reform era. 
Our findings challenge the widely claimed positive relationship between economic 
development and age homogamy, or more generally, the link between development and family 
changes. This reminds us that although relationships between economic development and family 
changes are commonly observed, they are neither necessary nor universal. Actual social 
processes are much more complicated and may be unique in specific social contexts (Thornton, 
2005). For example, historians Stone (1977) and Macfarlane (1979) have shown with data from 
Britain that individual freedom in mate selection emerged before the onset of the industrial 
revolution, rather than being produced by it. In this sense, the reversal of the trend in age 
homogamy in China’s post-reform era provides another interesting, historically and context-
specific case that defies a prediction based on economic development alone.           
We recognize that some important pieces are still missing from this puzzle. First, as a 
number of researchers have argued, remarriage, cohabitation, and delays in marriage may all 
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have a large influence on spousal age gaps (Atkinson and Glass, 1985; Bhrolchain, 1992; 
Bytheway, 1981; Qian, 1998; Stier and Shavit, 1994; Todd et al., 2005; Van Poppel et al., 2001; 
Vera et al., 1985; Wu et al., 2000). These three phenomena may be particularly relevant in this 
context given their increasingly greater prevalence in reform-era China (Jiang, 2002; Jin, Li, and 
Feldman, 2003; Shi, 2010; Wang and Zhou, 2010; Xu, Qiang, and Wang, 2003). It is unfortunate 
that our dataset does not include sufficient information on any of these phenomena, but this 
limitation should serve as a good starting point for future research.  
Second, due to the highly differential processes of social and economic development in 
rural versus urban China (Hauser and Xie, 2005; Xie and Hannum, 1996), our estimation of 
returns to education and work experience based on the CHIP urban samples is limited. Although 
we expect that only the levels of husbands’ earnings premiums – not the trends in age or status 
hypergamy – will change across the rural-urban divide, separate analyses using rural and urban 
samples will establish more accurate conclusions.  
Third, Mare and Schwartz (2006) and Torche (2010)’s works have shown fruitfulness in 
directly incorporating measures of husbands’ earnings premiums into models of educational 
homogamy. Although this approach would be a more straightforward way to test our “economic 
pressure” explanation, the required information on spouses’ educational attainment and earnings 
at the time of marriage is unavailable in the dataset we used.  
In terms of this study’s ability to project future trends in age hypergamy, we recognize 
that social, economic, and political events may generate new influences on marriage behaviors in 
post-reform era China. For example, in the face of rising social instabilities due to the 
skyrocketing costs of household establishments, the Chinese government may implement new 
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regulations to control and reduce housing prices, thereby weakening the influence of economic 
pressure on mate choice. It is also possible that gender inequality in the labor market  may 
change, and/or the norm of status hypergamy may fade with time. For the near future, however, 
we expect the conditions driving the most recent increases in age hypergamy to continue.  
Finally, the one-child policy could have an influence on spousal age gaps through its 
effect on the sex ratio at birth and the subsequent structure of the marriage market (Banister, 
2004; Zeng et al., 1993). However, the policy’s impact on the sex ratio has been mainly driven 
by prenatal sex detection technology, which became available in remote rural areas in the late-
1980s (Chu, 2001). Thus, the imbalanced sex ratio did not affect persons covered in our 
analyses. For more recent cohorts it did affect, the sex ratio may benefit women by providing 
them with a wider range of prospective husbands. In this newer regime, men may need even 
more time to accumulate economic resources to become attractive to young women on the 
marriage market. That is, the trend in age hypergamy discovered in this paper may be further 
perpetuated by rising masculine sex ratios at birth since the late 1980s.  
These remaining questions, the study’s research limitations, and the unique context of 
post-reform era China all serve as stimuli for future research on marital age homogamy and on 
other crucial social changes taking place in contemporary China. Given our unanticipated 
findings, further research on age homogamy in other countries is also of great interest. Research 
on these topics will shed new light on the changing patterns of gender norms, gender 
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1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Marriage Cohort
Husband-Wife Age Gap=0 [0,1]
[0,3] [-1,4]
Note: Percentages are calculated by dividing number of couples with the given age gap
by the total number of couples of the marriage cohort.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 2005 1% Population Inter-census Survey.

































1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Marriage Cohort
moving average raw
Note: Raw homogamy indicators are constructed as the ratio of sum of forces of attraction
(as defined in Equation(1)) where equals, over the sum of all forces of attraction for marriage cohort
1960-2005, with age in three-year groups. Their moving averages are constructed by averaging
the raw homogamy indicators for the adjacent seven marriage cohorts with equal weights.
Larger indicators reflect higher levels of marital age homogamy.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 2005 1% Population Inter-census Survey.
Figure 2.2. Levels of Age Homogamy by Force of Attraction
























1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Birth Cohort
Men Women
Note: Age homogamy is defined as marriages with husband-minus-wife age gaps lying between
[0,3] years. For this figure, percentages of age homogamy are calculated only for those who got
married at median age of first marriage within each birth cohort from 1940 to 1984, respectively
for men and women. To observe the trends more clearly, we constructed moving averages for
the adjacent seven birth cohorts with equal weights.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 2005 1% Population Inter-census Survey.
Figure 2.3. Percentage of Age Homogamy with Moving Averages































1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Marriage Cohort
Note: As shown are ratios of age hypergamy (percent couples with husband-minus-wife age
gaps larger than three years) to hypogamy (percent couples with husband-minus-wife age gaps
smaller than zero) for each marraige cohort of 1960-2005.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 2005 1% Population Inter-census Survey.





































1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Birth Cohort
Men Women
Note: As shown are ratios of age hypergamy (percent couples with husband-minus-wife age gaps larger
than three years) to hypogamy (percent couples with husband-minus-wife age gaps smaller than zero)
for those who got married at median age of first marriage within each birth cohort from 1940 to 1984,
respectively for men and women. To observe the trends more clearly, we constructed moving averages
for the adjacent seven birth cohorts with equal weights.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 2005 1% Population Inter-census Survey.
Figure 2.5. Relative Prevalence of Hypergamy to Hypogamy with Moving Averages













































1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Marriage Cohort
(a).Observed Education and Age at First Marriage (b).Observed Education and Age at First Marriage in 1985
(c).Observed Age at First Marriage and Education in 1985 (d).Education and Age at First Marriage in 1985
Note: Husbands' earnings premiums are calculated as the ratio of husbands' to wives' earnings.
Earnings are estimated by Mincer's human capital model based on years of schooling and age
at first marriage of each marriage cohort.
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, China 2005 1% Population Inter-census Survey.
Chinese Household Income Project 1988, 1995, 2002 (Urban Sample).












Appendix Table 2.1.  Homogamy Indicators Based on Forces of Attraction with Age Group of One, 1960-2005. 
Marriage 
Cohort 
Raw Equal Weights Varying Weights 
Adjacent 3 cohorts 5 cohorts 7 cohorts 9 cohorts 11 cohorts Adjacent 3 cohorts 5 cohorts 7 cohorts 9 cohorts 11 cohorts
1960 0.0959 0.0891 0.0863 0.0864 0.0881 0.0898 0.0914 0.0888 0.0879 0.0879 0.0885
1961 0.0823 0.0863 0.0864 0.0881 0.0898 0.0955 0.0853 0.0859 0.0867 0.0877 0.0898
1962 0.0806 0.0833 0.0881 0.0898 0.0955 0.0942 0.0826 0.0856 0.0873 0.0899 0.0911
1963 0.0868 0.0874 0.0885 0.0955 0.0942 0.0933 0.0872 0.0880 0.0913 0.0923 0.0925
1964 0.0947 0.0933 0.0981 0.0940 0.0933 0.0934 0.0936 0.0961 0.0952 0.0945 0.0942
1965 0.0983 0.1077 0.0990 0.0944 0.0931 0.0954 0.1053 0.1018 0.0986 0.0966 0.0962
1966 0.1300 0.1044 0.0987 0.0965 0.0968 0.0970 0.1108 0.1041 0.1008 0.0993 0.0986
1967 0.0851 0.1002 0.0988 0.1005 0.1005 0.0997 0.0965 0.0977 0.0989 0.0995 0.0996
1968 0.0856 0.0885 0.1021 0.1033 0.1032 0.1003 0.0878 0.0958 0.0991 0.1006 0.1005
1969 0.0948 0.0985 0.0990 0.1052 0.1024 0.1031 0.0976 0.0983 0.1013 0.1017 0.1021
1970 0.1150 0.1080 0.1042 0.0990 0.1046 0.1047 0.1098 0.1067 0.1033 0.1038 0.1041
1971 0.1142 0.1135 0.1045 0.1037 0.1026 0.1092 0.1137 0.1086 0.1065 0.1051 0.1063
1972 0.1113 0.1042 0.1091 0.1075 0.1096 0.1097 0.1060 0.1077 0.1076 0.1083 0.1087
1973 0.0870 0.1054 0.1086 0.1152 0.1151 0.1139 0.1008 0.1051 0.1095 0.1115 0.1122
1974 0.1179 0.1057 0.1154 0.1180 0.1191 0.1186 0.1088 0.1124 0.1148 0.1164 0.1171
1975 0.1123 0.1261 0.1200 0.1204 0.1217 0.1229 0.1227 0.1212 0.1208 0.1211 0.1217
1976 0.1483 0.1317 0.1289 0.1242 0.1247 0.1240 0.1359 0.1320 0.1286 0.1272 0.1262
1977 0.1347 0.1380 0.1329 0.1320 0.1264 0.1275 0.1372 0.1348 0.1336 0.1310 0.1299
1978 0.1312 0.1347 0.1388 0.1333 0.1337 0.1304 0.1338 0.1366 0.1351 0.1346 0.1334
1979 0.1382 0.1370 0.1345 0.1391 0.1366 0.1348 0.1373 0.1358 0.1372 0.1370 0.1363
1980 0.1416 0.1355 0.1381 0.1384 0.1392 0.1382 0.1371 0.1377 0.1380 0.1384 0.1384
1981 0.1268 0.1404 0.1407 0.1386 0.1399 0.1407 0.1370 0.1390 0.1388 0.1392 0.1397
1982 0.1528 0.1411 0.1401 0.1419 0.1405 0.1410 0.1441 0.1419 0.1419 0.1414 0.1413
1983 0.1438 0.1440 0.1427 0.1422 0.1427 0.1428 0.1440 0.1433 0.1428 0.1428 0.1428
1984 0.1355 0.1447 0.1454 0.1435 0.1446 0.1434 0.1424 0.1441 0.1438 0.1441 0.1439
1985 0.1547 0.1435 0.1450 0.1475 0.1442 0.1429 0.1463 0.1456 0.1464 0.1456 0.1448
1986 0.1403 0.1486 0.1472 0.1455 0.1448 0.1438 0.1465 0.1469 0.1463 0.1457 0.1451
1987 0.1509 0.1486 0.1478 0.1438 0.1447 0.1450 0.1492 0.1484 0.1464 0.1458 0.1455
1988 0.1546 0.1480 0.1433 0.1461 0.1443 0.1444 0.1497 0.1461 0.1461 0.1454 0.1451
1989 0.1385 0.1417 0.1455 0.1441 0.1454 0.1448 0.1409 0.1435 0.1437 0.1444 0.1445
1990 0.1320 0.1407 0.1434 0.1449 0.1447 0.1449 0.1385 0.1413 0.1428 0.1435 0.1439
1991 0.1517 0.1414 0.1417 0.1445 0.1443 0.1447 0.1439 0.1427 0.1435 0.1438 0.1441
1992 0.1404 0.1460 0.1436 0.1419 0.1445 0.1457 0.1446 0.1441 0.1431 0.1436 0.1443
1993 0.1460 0.1448 0.1445 0.1440 0.1442 0.1444 0.1451 0.1448 0.1444 0.1443 0.1444
1994 0.1481 0.1435 0.1448 0.1467 0.1439 0.1438 0.1447 0.1447 0.1456 0.1450 0.1446
1995 0.1364 0.1459 0.1470 0.1445 0.1457 0.1451 0.1435 0.1454 0.1450 0.1453 0.1452
1996 0.1533 0.1469 0.1451 0.1456 0.1459 0.1459 0.1485 0.1466 0.1462 0.1461 0.1460
1997 0.1511 0.1469 0.1450 0.1467 0.1459 0.1456 0.1480 0.1463 0.1465 0.1463 0.1461
1998 0.1365 0.1452 0.1484 0.1456 0.1461 0.1448 0.1430 0.1460 0.1458 0.1459 0.1456
1999 0.1479 0.1459 0.1459 0.1472 0.1443 0.1446 0.1464 0.1461 0.1466 0.1458 0.1454
2000 0.1533 0.1473 0.1452 0.1442 0.1451 0.1421 0.1488 0.1468 0.1457 0.1455 0.1444
2001 0.1407 0.1473 0.1443 0.1431 0.1415 0.1427 0.1456 0.1449 0.1441 0.1432 0.1430
2002 0.1477 0.1401 0.1435 0.1408 0.1403 0.1415 0.1420 0.1428 0.1420 0.1414 0.1414
2003 0.1318 0.1411 0.1369 0.1396 0.1408 0.1403 0.1388 0.1377 0.1385 0.1392 0.1395
2004 0.1438 0.1320 0.1359 0.1369 0.1396 0.1408 0.1350 0.1354 0.1360 0.1372 0.1381
2005 0.1203 0.1321 0.1320 0.1359 0.1369 0.1396 0.1282 0.1301 0.1324 0.1339 0.1355
Note: Homogamy indicators are constructed by the forces of attraction based on age groups of one year. Specifically, the groups are the single ages for those 
aged between 20 and 35 and we combine those under age 20 as a group 15-19 and those above age 35 as two groups 36-40 and 41-50. Moving averages are 
calculated to smooth the trend, and are computed respectively with equal and varying weights for the adjacent 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 marriage cohorts. For those with 
three adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively ¼, ½ and ¼; for those with five adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/9, 2/9, 1/3, 2/9 and 
1/9; for those with seven adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/16, 1/8, 3/16, 1/4, 3/16, 1/8 and 1/16; for those with nine adjacent cohorts, weights 
applied are respectively 1/25, 2/25, 3/25, 4/25, 1/5, 4/25, 3/25, 2/25 and 1/25; for those with eleven adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/36, 1/18, 
1/12, 1/9, 5/36, 1/6, 5/36, 1/9, 1/12, 1/18 and 1/36. 
 








Raw Equal Weights Varying Weights 
Adjacent 3 cohorts 5 cohorts 7 cohorts 9 cohorts 11 cohorts Adjacent 3 cohorts 5 cohorts 7 cohorts 9 cohorts 11 cohorts
1960 0.2379 0.2131 0.2100 0.2051 0.2037 0.2048 0.2214 0.2157 0.2115 0.2089 0.2077
1961 0.1884 0.2100 0.2051 0.2037 0.2048 0.2073 0.2046 0.2049 0.2044 0.2045 0.2053
1962 0.2038 0.1942 0.2037 0.2048 0.2073 0.2068 0.1966 0.2005 0.2023 0.2038 0.2046
1963 0.1905 0.1974 0.1982 0.2073 0.2068 0.2061 0.1957 0.1971 0.2015 0.2033 0.2040
1964 0.1979 0.1996 0.2049 0.2023 0.2061 0.2069 0.1992 0.2024 0.2024 0.2037 0.2046
1965 0.2105 0.2101 0.2048 0.2040 0.2034 0.2083 0.2102 0.2072 0.2058 0.2050 0.2060
1966 0.2219 0.2119 0.2068 0.2056 0.2072 0.2059 0.2144 0.2102 0.2082 0.2078 0.2072
1967 0.2034 0.2085 0.2101 0.2100 0.2081 0.2065 0.2072 0.2088 0.2094 0.2089 0.2082
1968 0.2002 0.2060 0.2124 0.2121 0.2086 0.2064 0.2046 0.2089 0.2103 0.2097 0.2087
1969 0.2145 0.2122 0.2105 0.2098 0.2091 0.2064 0.2128 0.2115 0.2108 0.2102 0.2090
1970 0.2219 0.2163 0.2087 0.2071 0.2069 0.2064 0.2177 0.2127 0.2102 0.2090 0.2082
1971 0.2124 0.2096 0.2092 0.2052 0.2043 0.2079 0.2103 0.2096 0.2077 0.2065 0.2069
1972 0.1944 0.2031 0.2043 0.2050 0.2068 0.2062 0.2009 0.2028 0.2038 0.2049 0.2053
1973 0.2026 0.1958 0.1997 0.2067 0.2072 0.2100 0.1975 0.1987 0.2022 0.2040 0.2058
1974 0.1904 0.1972 0.2025 0.2040 0.2106 0.2112 0.1955 0.1994 0.2014 0.2047 0.2067
1975 0.1985 0.2052 0.2043 0.2087 0.2097 0.2135 0.2035 0.2039 0.2060 0.2073 0.2092
1976 0.2265 0.2095 0.2128 0.2115 0.2127 0.2160 0.2137 0.2132 0.2125 0.2125 0.2136
1977 0.2034 0.2250 0.2175 0.2167 0.2188 0.2223 0.2196 0.2184 0.2177 0.2181 0.2194
1978 0.2452 0.2208 0.2256 0.2252 0.2276 0.2281 0.2269 0.2262 0.2257 0.2264 0.2269
1979 0.2138 0.2327 0.2303 0.2371 0.2352 0.2302 0.2280 0.2293 0.2327 0.2336 0.2325
1980 0.2391 0.2343 0.2459 0.2416 0.2381 0.2374 0.2355 0.2413 0.2414 0.2402 0.2393
1981 0.2500 0.2568 0.2486 0.2447 0.2429 0.2417 0.2551 0.2515 0.2485 0.2465 0.2450
1982 0.2814 0.2633 0.2508 0.2482 0.2477 0.2452 0.2678 0.2584 0.2539 0.2517 0.2497
1983 0.2586 0.2550 0.2569 0.2529 0.2499 0.2498 0.2559 0.2564 0.2549 0.2531 0.2521
1984 0.2249 0.2510 0.2562 0.2566 0.2543 0.2516 0.2445 0.2510 0.2535 0.2538 0.2531
1985 0.2696 0.2471 0.2530 0.2571 0.2572 0.2551 0.2527 0.2528 0.2547 0.2556 0.2555
1986 0.2467 0.2604 0.2520 0.2548 0.2574 0.2568 0.2570 0.2542 0.2545 0.2555 0.2559
1987 0.2650 0.2552 0.2601 0.2538 0.2548 0.2577 0.2576 0.2590 0.2567 0.2560 0.2565
1988 0.2537 0.2614 0.2564 0.2585 0.2550 0.2544 0.2594 0.2578 0.2581 0.2570 0.2562
1989 0.2653 0.2568 0.2586 0.2572 0.2572 0.2552 0.2589 0.2588 0.2581 0.2578 0.2570
1990 0.2515 0.2581 0.2577 0.2570 0.2569 0.2548 0.2565 0.2571 0.2571 0.2570 0.2563
1991 0.2576 0.2564 0.2560 0.2572 0.2541 0.2514 0.2567 0.2563 0.2567 0.2558 0.2544
1992 0.2603 0.2544 0.2563 0.2525 0.2505 0.2492 0.2559 0.2561 0.2546 0.2531 0.2519
1993 0.2454 0.2575 0.2502 0.2479 0.2470 0.2464 0.2545 0.2521 0.2503 0.2491 0.2483
1994 0.2668 0.2444 0.2452 0.2437 0.2435 0.2424 0.2500 0.2473 0.2457 0.2449 0.2441
1995 0.2209 0.2401 0.2376 0.2403 0.2388 0.2380 0.2353 0.2366 0.2382 0.2384 0.2383
1996 0.2326 0.2253 0.2353 0.2331 0.2343 0.2368 0.2271 0.2317 0.2323 0.2330 0.2342
1997 0.2223 0.2296 0.2238 0.2290 0.2319 0.2330 0.2278 0.2256 0.2271 0.2288 0.2301
1998 0.2339 0.2219 0.2231 0.2250 0.2286 0.2275 0.2249 0.2239 0.2244 0.2259 0.2264
1999 0.2094 0.2202 0.2242 0.2243 0.2211 0.2245 0.2175 0.2212 0.2226 0.2220 0.2228
2000 0.2172 0.2217 0.2230 0.2195 0.2202 0.2181 0.2205 0.2219 0.2209 0.2206 0.2199
2001 0.2384 0.2239 0.2161 0.2181 0.2162 0.2178 0.2275 0.2212 0.2198 0.2185 0.2183
2002 0.2161 0.2180 0.2167 0.2128 0.2154 0.2162 0.2175 0.2171 0.2152 0.2153 0.2155
2003 0.1994 0.2094 0.2126 0.2133 0.2128 0.2154 0.2069 0.2100 0.2114 0.2118 0.2128
2004 0.2126 0.2028 0.2061 0.2126 0.2133 0.2128 0.2053 0.2057 0.2083 0.2099 0.2107
2005 0.1964 0.2045 0.2028 0.2061 0.2126 0.2133 0.2018 0.2023 0.2038 0.2067 0.2086
Note: Homogamy indicators are constructed by the forces of attraction based on age groups of three years. Specifically, we divide individuals into age groups 15-19, 20-
22, 23-25, 26-28, 29-31, 32-35, 36-40, and 41-50. Moving averages are calculated to smooth the trend, and are computed respectively with equal and varying weights for 
the adjacent 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 marriage cohorts. For those with three adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively ¼, ½ and ¼; for those with five adjacent cohorts, 
weights applied are respectively 1/9, 2/9, 1/3, 2/9 and 1/9; for those with seven adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/16, 1/8, 3/16, 1/4, 3/16, 1/8 and 1/16; 
for those with nine adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/25, 2/25, 3/25, 4/25, 1/5, 4/25, 3/25, 2/25 and 1/25; for those with eleven adjacent cohorts, weights 
applied are respectively 1/36, 1/18, 1/12, 1/9, 5/36, 1/6, 5/36, 1/9, 1/12, 1/18 and 1/36. 
 





Appendix Table 2.3.  Homogamy Indicators Based on Forces of Attraction with Age Group of Five, 1960-2005. 
Marriage 
Cohort 
Raw Equal Weights Varying Weights 
Adjacent 3 cohorts 5 cohorts 7 cohorts 9 cohorts 11 cohorts Adjacent 3 cohorts 5 cohorts 7 cohorts 9 cohorts 11 cohorts
1960 0.3727 0.3633 0.3716 0.3742 0.3758 0.3814 0.3664 0.3690 0.3711 0.3726 0.3751
1961 0.3538 0.3716 0.3742 0.3758 0.3814 0.3862 0.3671 0.3707 0.3726 0.3754 0.3783
1962 0.3882 0.3747 0.3758 0.3814 0.3862 0.3888 0.3780 0.3768 0.3786 0.3810 0.3831
1963 0.3820 0.3841 0.3831 0.3862 0.3888 0.3900 0.3836 0.3833 0.3846 0.3860 0.3871
1964 0.3822 0.3912 0.3953 0.3910 0.3900 0.3966 0.3890 0.3925 0.3919 0.3912 0.3927
1965 0.4095 0.4022 0.3991 0.3976 0.3992 0.4003 0.4040 0.4013 0.3997 0.3995 0.3998
1966 0.4148 0.4104 0.4026 0.4073 0.4086 0.4073 0.4115 0.4066 0.4069 0.4075 0.4074
1967 0.4068 0.4071 0.4174 0.4153 0.4154 0.4169 0.4070 0.4128 0.4139 0.4144 0.4152
1968 0.3997 0.4208 0.4230 0.4249 0.4239 0.4213 0.4156 0.4197 0.4220 0.4227 0.4223
1969 0.4560 0.4312 0.4301 0.4320 0.4300 0.4301 0.4374 0.4333 0.4327 0.4317 0.4312
1970 0.4379 0.4479 0.4404 0.4351 0.4377 0.4376 0.4454 0.4426 0.4393 0.4387 0.4384
1971 0.4499 0.4488 0.4478 0.4454 0.4432 0.4455 0.4491 0.4484 0.4471 0.4457 0.4456
1972 0.4587 0.4484 0.4524 0.4546 0.4533 0.4512 0.4510 0.4518 0.4530 0.4531 0.4525
1973 0.4366 0.4581 0.4577 0.4605 0.4619 0.4608 0.4527 0.4555 0.4577 0.4592 0.4597
1974 0.4788 0.4599 0.4672 0.4662 0.4682 0.4712 0.4646 0.4660 0.4661 0.4669 0.4682
1975 0.4643 0.4802 0.4709 0.4751 0.4766 0.4755 0.4762 0.4733 0.4741 0.4750 0.4751
1976 0.4973 0.4798 0.4861 0.4829 0.4826 0.4829 0.4842 0.4852 0.4842 0.4836 0.4834
1977 0.4777 0.4958 0.4930 0.4926 0.4892 0.4921 0.4912 0.4922 0.4924 0.4912 0.4915
1978 0.5123 0.5011 0.5010 0.4982 0.5019 0.4993 0.5039 0.5023 0.5005 0.5010 0.5005
1979 0.5134 0.5099 0.5052 0.5106 0.5085 0.5069 0.5108 0.5077 0.5090 0.5088 0.5082
1980 0.5040 0.5120 0.5198 0.5164 0.5148 0.5118 0.5100 0.5155 0.5159 0.5155 0.5144
1981 0.5186 0.5245 0.5250 0.5226 0.5186 0.5139 0.5230 0.5241 0.5235 0.5217 0.5193
1982 0.5509 0.5359 0.5265 0.5254 0.5197 0.5165 0.5396 0.5323 0.5293 0.5258 0.5230
1983 0.5382 0.5366 0.5321 0.5217 0.5213 0.5214 0.5370 0.5343 0.5288 0.5261 0.5246
1984 0.5207 0.5303 0.5258 0.5248 0.5233 0.5232 0.5279 0.5268 0.5259 0.5250 0.5244
1985 0.5321 0.5134 0.5209 0.5268 0.5264 0.5234 0.5180 0.5196 0.5228 0.5241 0.5239
1986 0.4873 0.5152 0.5197 0.5240 0.5261 0.5252 0.5082 0.5146 0.5187 0.5214 0.5225
1987 0.5262 0.5152 0.5219 0.5209 0.5230 0.5237 0.5180 0.5201 0.5205 0.5214 0.5221
1988 0.5322 0.5300 0.5187 0.5212 0.5191 0.5202 0.5305 0.5240 0.5228 0.5214 0.5211
1989 0.5316 0.5267 0.5258 0.5170 0.5182 0.5180 0.5279 0.5267 0.5225 0.5209 0.5200
1990 0.5162 0.5235 0.5211 0.5206 0.5162 0.5163 0.5217 0.5214 0.5210 0.5193 0.5184
1991 0.5229 0.5139 0.5172 0.5188 0.5178 0.5154 0.5162 0.5167 0.5177 0.5177 0.5170
1992 0.5028 0.5127 0.5136 0.5145 0.5173 0.5186 0.5102 0.5121 0.5132 0.5147 0.5159
1993 0.5126 0.5097 0.5108 0.5132 0.5162 0.5185 0.5104 0.5106 0.5117 0.5133 0.5149
1994 0.5137 0.5094 0.5106 0.5140 0.5155 0.5174 0.5105 0.5106 0.5121 0.5133 0.5146
1995 0.5019 0.5126 0.5145 0.5144 0.5160 0.5163 0.5099 0.5125 0.5133 0.5143 0.5149
1996 0.5222 0.5154 0.5171 0.5169 0.5156 0.5148 0.5171 0.5171 0.5170 0.5165 0.5160
1997 0.5220 0.5233 0.5183 0.5179 0.5153 0.5134 0.5230 0.5204 0.5193 0.5179 0.5165
1998 0.5255 0.5225 0.5219 0.5159 0.5147 0.5133 0.5233 0.5225 0.5196 0.5179 0.5165
1999 0.5201 0.5218 0.5174 0.5167 0.5133 0.5141 0.5214 0.5192 0.5181 0.5164 0.5157
2000 0.5199 0.5132 0.5145 0.5136 0.5155 0.5113 0.5148 0.5147 0.5142 0.5147 0.5136
2001 0.4996 0.5090 0.5096 0.5136 0.5111 0.5122 0.5067 0.5083 0.5106 0.5108 0.5112
2002 0.5076 0.5027 0.5100 0.5075 0.5097 0.5111 0.5039 0.5073 0.5074 0.5081 0.5089
2003 0.5009 0.5101 0.5025 0.5054 0.5075 0.5097 0.5078 0.5048 0.5050 0.5058 0.5069
2004 0.5219 0.5017 0.5032 0.5025 0.5054 0.5075 0.5068 0.5050 0.5040 0.5044 0.5052
2005 0.4823 0.5021 0.5017 0.5032 0.5025 0.5054 0.4955 0.4986 0.5004 0.5011 0.5023
Note: Homogamy indicators are constructed by the forces of attraction based on age groups of five years. Specifically, we divide individuals into age groups 15-19, 20-24, 
25-29, 30-35, 36-40 and 41-50. Moving averages are calculated to smooth the trend, and are computed respectively with equal and varying weights for the adjacent 3, 5, 7, 
9 and 11 marriage cohorts. For those with three adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively ¼, ½ and ¼; for those with five adjacent cohorts, weights applied are 
respectively 1/9, 2/9, 1/3, 2/9 and 1/9; for those with seven adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/16, 1/8, 3/16, 1/4, 3/16, 1/8 and 1/16; for those with nine 
adjacent cohorts, weights applied are respectively 1/25, 2/25, 3/25, 4/25, 1/5, 4/25, 3/25, 2/25 and 1/25; for those with eleven adjacent cohorts, weights applied are 
respectively 1/36, 1/18, 1/12, 1/9, 5/36, 1/6, 5/36, 1/9, 1/12, 1/18 and 1/36. 
 








Context Matters: Residential Concentration and Marital Behaviors of Muslim Chinese 
3.1 Introduction 
Social context plays an important role in forming and framing individual’s marital behaviors 
(Blau and Schwartz, 1997). In the sociological studies on marriage and family, the relationship 
between local population composition and individuals’ marital choices has long been a research 
focus (e.g., Blau, Blum and Schwartz, 1982; Harris and Ono, 2005; Kennedy, 1943; Lewis and 
Oppenheimer, 2000; Lichter, Anderson and Hayward, 1995; Raley, 1996). Numerous studies 
have interpreted the contextual effects as structural constraints that influence one’s chances to 
meet their potential spouses with particular traits (e.g., Blau et al., 1982; Lewis and Oppenheimer, 
2000; Lichter et al., 1995; Raley, 1996). However, other studies have argued that social context 
may also influence individual’s marital behaviors through “cultural pathways” by forming their 
preference for or by imposing group-level pressures against specific marital outcomes (Barber, 
2004; Cheng and Xie, 2013; Jennings and Barber, 2013). Though important, it has long been 
argued that it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the structural and cultural influences 




Hui, as the only Chinese speaking Muslim group in China, are unique in their ethno-
religious characteristics. Different from other Muslim Chinese ethnic groups,12 especially those 
of Turkic ancestries, Hui are almost indistinguishable from the majority ethnic group Han in 
various characteristics including physical appearance and language, and they are well assimilated 
into the Han culture. Therefore, the Islamic belief is almost the only marker that keeps them a 
distinct ethnic group (Lipman, 2004). Hence, marrying within the Hui group, i.e., choosing 
ethnic endogamy,13 has long been strictly practiced by Hui people to secure ethnic identity and to 
maintain religious purity (Zhou, 2001). This practice of endogamy is also enforced by the 
Islamic religion, which at the same time heavily values universal marriage and men’s dominant 
positions over women (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald, 2008; Khairabadi, 1982; Mernissi, 1996).  
Therefore, Hui people’s marital behaviors are constrained by both the norm of endogamy and the 
norm of universal marriage, and women may be under stronger normative pressures than men. 
In terms of operationalization, the unique pattern of Hui’s residential distribution makes 
the local concentration of Hui a good measure of the contextual factor that influences the 
individual marital behaviors. First, Hui, as the most residentially dispersed minority group in 
China, are most likely to be under varying contextual influences. In addition, their residential 
concentration shows the pattern of “national dispersion, local concentration” (“da fen san, xiao ji 
zhong”) (Hai, 2010; Ma, 2000). In most of the cases, Hui people self-select themselves to live in 
places with a higher Hui concentration for more convenient living and religious activities (Hai, 
                                                            
12 Muslim ethnic groups in China are divided by language. Turkic-speakers: Uygur, Qazak, Tatar, Uzbek, Salar, and 
Kirgiz; Mongolic-speakers: Dongxiang and Bonan; Persian-speakers: Tajiks; Chinese-speakers: Hui (Lipman 1997). 
13 Due to the marked physical distinctions between Hui and other Muslim ethnic groups, intermarriages between 
different Muslim groups are highly rare (China Data Center 2005). Hui Muslims mainly rely on ethnic endogamy, 




2010; Ma, 2000). Therefore, in places with higher Hui concentrations, the Islamic religion has 
usually been practiced more thoroughly and devoutly (Mamet, Jacobson and Heaton, 2005). In 
this sense, the residential concentration of Hui can not only captures the level of structural 
constraints for Hui to meet their potential spouses inside Hui, but also captures the normative 
pressures against choosing exogamy or remaining single.  
Accordingly, this paper addresses the following questions: how are Hui’s marital 
behaviors framed by the two norms? When caught by the pressures from both norms, how would 
Hui make their marital choices? And how would Hui women’s choices differ from men’s? 
Specifically, using data from the China 2000 census and the 2005 1% inter-census survey (2005 
mini-census), this paper examines how the prefecture-level Hui concentration influences Hui 
Muslims’ choices between endogamy, exogamy and singleness, respectively for men and women.  
By this empirical investigation, the paper contributes to the field of marriage and family in two 
ways: first, it tests the contextual influence of the local ethnic marriage markets on individual 
marital choices on a unique Chinese Muslim group, whose residential patterns reflect both the 
structural constraints and cultural pressures for making marital choices. More importantly, by 
comparing the contextual effects across different marital outcomes and by gender, it sheds light 
on the relative strengths of the two cultural norms of marriage for Hui Muslims, as well as the 
gender difference in the strictness of those norms.  
        
3.2 Theoretical issues and research setting 




A body of literature has focused on the relationship between “field of eligibles” within the local 
marriage markets and the resulting marital choices (Blau et al., 1982; Blau and Schwartz, 1997; 
Lewis and Oppenheimer, 2000; Lichter, 1990; Lichter, LeClere and McLaughlin, 1991; Lichter 
et al., 1992; Lichter et al., 1995). Those studies often measure conditions of the local marriage 
markets either by sex ratios (Lichter et al., 1992; Lichter et al., 1995), the local concentrations of 
specific groups or the overall local heterogeneities in terms of age, race/ethnicity, education or 
economic potentials (Blau et al., 1982; Blau and Schwartz, 1997; Lewis and Oppenheimer, 2000). 
For interpretation, most of those studies consider conditions of the local marriage markets as 
structural constraints, that is, the extent to which unmarried individuals are sufficiently exposed 
to the opportunities to meet their potential mates (Blau et al., 1982; Blau and Schwartz, 1997).  
However, aside from the structural constraints, the local marriage market can also form 
and frame cultural factors, such as norms and preferences (Cheng and Xie, 2013; Lichter, 1990; 
Zeng and Xie, 2008), which influence individuals’ marital behaviors through distinctive 
mechanisms (Fu, 2001; Jayakody, Thornton and Axinn, 2008; Kalmijn and Van Tubergen, 2010; 
Thornton, 2001, 2005). Specifically, social context can operate either through local socialization 
or through local social pressure (Jennings and Barber, 2013). First, through close and constant 
interactions among individuals within the local area, the prevailing beliefs and attitudes may 
diffuse. This process may lead local individuals to internalize the locally dominant preference 
and fortify or change their own preferences to adhere to the mainstream ones (Barber, 2004; 
Dharmalingam, 1996; Katz, Joiner and Kwon, 2002). In addition, a local community can also 
exert social pressures on individuals by enforcing social norms. In order to blend in with the 




the dominant ones (Coleman, 1990; Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010; Troyer and Younts, 1997). That is, 
social contexts may play a unique role in forming and changing individuals’ marital behaviors, 
aside from the structural constraints.  
For example, in places where a higher percentage of population have received post-
secondary education, structurally speaking, there is a larger supply of socioeconomically 
attractive “candidates” for marriage and this larger supply should lead to higher rates of marriage 
as well as earlier ages at marriage. However, on the other hand, in those places with more highly 
educated individuals, people’s attitudes toward marriage also tend to be more liberal and more 
individualistic, and they may feel less pressure to behave in alignment with others’ opinions, 
which could result in fewer and later marriages. Hence, it is crucial to try to understand the 
contextual effects of the local marriage market from both the structural and cultural perspectives. 
In this sense, our measure of the contextual condition – local concentration of Hui – captures 
both the structural constraints and the cultural influences of the social context.  
 
3.2.2 Chinese Hui Muslim 
Hui Muslim is one of the ten Muslim ethnic groups and one of the fifty-five minority ethnic 
groups in China. While the ethnic majority Han dominate 90.95 percent of the national 
population, Hui only constitute 0.77 percent of the national population (China Data Center, 
2005). They are highly similar to Han in physical appearance; they speak Chinese and have 
adopted most of the cultural practices of Han. Except for their Islamic religion, Hui are well 
acculturated into the majority Han (Zang, 2005, 2006, 2012). Also, as the most widely dispersed 




experience differential tensions between the desire to retain their own ethnic identity and the 
necessity to assimilate into the Han culture. Since one major indicator of ethnic assimilation is 
the rate of intermarriage (Qian, 1997; Qian and Lichter, 2007; Schoen, Wooldredge and Thomas, 
1989), Hui constitutes as an ideal group on whom we could apply the framework of the 
relationship between local marriage market conditions and the resulting marital choices.  
It has been widely established that Islamic religion is patriarchal and endogamous in 
family practices (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald, 2008; Khairabadi, 1982; Mernissi, 1996; 
Morgan et al., 2002; Zang, 2005, 2006). Islam strongly emphasizes the family and takes it as the 
foundation of the society (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald, 2008). Correspondingly, as believers 
of Islam, Hui tend to establish their families at an early age, to value universal marriage, and to 
marry within the group so as to secure ethnic identity and to keep religious purity. Thus, given 
Hui’s dual strong norms of universal marriage and endogamy, it is of interest to know, when 
social context imposes constraints on the realization of the two norms, how Hui persons respond? 
Delaying marriage, or staying single, or marrying out of the group? The answer to this question 
lends light to the relative strengths of the two norms. Also, according to Islam, women are 
considered to assume a subordinate position to men (Abbasi-Shavazi and McDonald, 2008; 
Khairabadi, 1982). So would women be subject to stronger religious norms in marital behaviors?  
The most salient feature of the Hui’s residential concentration is “national dispersion, 
local concentration” (“da fen san, xiao ji zhong”) (Hai, 2010; Ma, 2000). Hui Muslims tend to 
self-select into areas with higher Hui concentration so that they could build their own living 
facilities, such as mosques, schools, restaurants, and perform religious practice more rigorously. 




beliefs (Kalmijn, 1998). Correspondingly, in places with higher Hui concentrations, Islamic 
belief is usually more powerful, and Hui Muslims are often more devout and follow religious 
practice more strictly (Hai, 2010; Ma, 2000). Thus, in terms of its impact on marital choices, 
local concentration of Hui not only indicates Hui Muslims’ potential opportunities to meet other 
eligible Hui peers as potential spouses, but also indicates the religious norms Hui Muslims are 
imposed or internalized for making marital choices.  
To recapitulate, Hui Muslims, as believers of Islam, hold the norms of universal marriage 
and endogamy. Therefore, in places with higher concentration of Hui, we expect Hui to have 
higher marriage rate, younger age at marriage and a larger prevalence of endogamy. This could 
be due to both the increasing opportunities to meet other Hui as eligible marriage candidates, and 
the stronger norms regarding marriage, imposed or internalized. However, what would happen to 
Hui when they are faced with the choice between exogamy and delay of marriage or even 
singleness? Will they choose exogamy to fulfill the norm of universal marriage, or will they 
delay or even retreat from marriage to maintain the norm of endogamy? Will men and women 
behave differently?  
More explicitly, this paper aims to answer the following three research questions:  
(1) How do the marriage timing and marriage rate of Hui vary across levels of Hui 
concentration? 
(2) How does the tendency to choose exogamy of Hui vary across levels of Hui 
concentration? 




By answering those three questions, we apply the framework of the contextual effects on 
marital choices on a unique ethnic group by operationalizing both the structural and the cultural 
conditions of the social context. More importantly, by comparing the contextual effects on 
various marital choices, this study lends light to the relative strengths of the two norms regarding 
marriage, as well as the Islamic gender ideology for Hui people. 
 
3.3 Data and methods 
This study is mainly based on a random sample of the China 2005 1% inter-census survey (2005 
mini-census). We use discrete-time hazard models and binary logit models to capture the 
contextual effects on marital choices. All models are estimated separately for men and women 
regarding their potentially differential mechanisms in marital choices (Xie et al., 2003). 
 
3.3.1 Analytical samples 
We construct two separate samples for different analyses. The first sample is a larger sample and 
is restricted to include those Hui Muslims aged 15-50,14 which age range has the major risk for 
marriage. We use this sample to perform descriptive analyses so as to get a more general profile 
of the relationship between local Hui concentration and Hui’s marital behaviors, considering the 
more limited sample availability of Hui after further data restrictions.  
The second sample involves further restrictions for the statistical rigor of the main 
analysis.15 First, China 2005 mini-census does not include information on place of marriage, so 
                                                            
14 Descriptive statistics of this sample are in Appendix Table 2. 




the resulting measures of the local marriage market conditions based on their current place of 
residence may not reflect the contextual characteristics the individual was actually exposed to 
when getting married. Hence, we restrict the dataset to those who did not leave their place of 
residential registration and those who lived within the province of residence both one year ago 
(Year 2004) and five years ago (Year 2000). Second, we further restrict the sample to those who 
were still single in 2000 (they may remain single in 2005 or get married between 2000 and 2005) 
so as to include those who were under the contextual influence of 2000 in their places of 
residential registration as shown in the 2005 mini-census. This restriction is based on the 
assumption that the local concentrations of Hui are relatively stable across a five-year time span, 
which seems reasonable (Hai, 2010; Ma, 2000). By making this restriction, we also account for 
the fact that one’s marital choices should be attributable to marriage market conditions before the 
time of marriage. Accordingly, we calculate local concentration of Hui based on the 2000 census 
data. Third, for individuals already married in 2005, we only include those who were in their first 
marriages, because the dataset only includes information on age at first marriage. These 
restrictions leave us with 2,804 observations for men and 2,399 observations for women. In order 
to capture the pool of eligible marriage candidates and to accurately estimate the likelihood of 
marital choices, for analysis on marital transitions from singleness, we transform the dataset into 
a pseudo-longitudinal format with person-years being the unit of analysis (Hannum, Wang and 
Adams, 2008). The total amount of exposure is 19,005 person-years for men and 13,322 person-
years for women.  
 




Hui Muslims are constrained by two norms of marriage: norm of universal marriage and norm of 
endogamy. Practically, these norms involve the marital decisions of whether to get married and 
whether to marry within Hui. To examine the contextual influence on the first decision, we can 
simply treat endogamy and exogamy as equivalent destinations from singleness, and compute the 
total marriage rate based on the outcome of married versus singleness (Thornton, Axinn and Xie, 
2010). However, for the second decision, we need to consider the heterogeneities among 
individuals, so as to gain a fuller understanding of the mechanisms of the marital choices. If we 
assume that the prevailing marital outcomes are an accurate reflection of one’s actual marital 
preference, then whether to include the single persons into the analysis may influence the 
theoretical interpretations that follow.  
Specifically, if we focus exclusively on those already married, we may conceptualize 
them as individuals who are fortunate enough to be able to contract the marriage with partners of 
their preferred type, and their existing marital choices fully reveal their marital preferences 
between endogamy and exogamy. By this approach, we examine the relative prevalence of 
exogamy over endogamy, which only measures the strength of the norm of endogamy.  
However, if we introduce those who are still single into the picture, we may assume that 
we are including those who are still out there on the marriage market, debating between the two 
norms of marriage. They may be waiting for a partner who is also Hui, or they may have already 
foregone marriage to avoid exogamy. Based on this latter approach which includes everyone, we 
are conceptualizing the marital decision process as one where people treat endogamy, exogamy 
and singleness as independent competing options. By this approach, we can evaluate the 




Practically, based on the first approach, we evaluate the contextual effects on the logged 
odds of exogamy over endogamy among married Hui only. Based on the second approach, we 
use a pair of outcomes of endogamy versus singleness, and exogamy versus singleness among all 
Hui (Thornton et al., 2010).   
 
3.3.3 Measures 
Dependent Variables: Marital choices. For the choice of getting married or not, this is a binary 
variable with 0=stay single and 1=married, and we use discrete-time hazard models. Conditional 
on getting married, for the choice between endogamy and exogamy, we use a binary variable 
with 0=endogamy and 1=exogamy and accordingly binary logit models. For the choice between 
endogamy, exogamy and singleness, we use two binary variables of endogamy or singleness 
with 0= stay single and 1= endogamy, and exogamy or singleness with 0=stay single and 1= 
exogamy, and a pair of discrete-time hazard models correspondingly.  
 
 Key Independent Variable: Local conditions of ethnic marriage markets. We use prefecture-
level concentration of Hui to measure condition of the local ethnic marriage market. Specifically, 
it is calculated as the percentage of Hui population over the total population in a given prefecture. 
Note that we compute the percentages at the prefecture-level, an administrative unit small 
enough to ensure sufficient variability across units and large enough to reflect the scale of the 
marriage market that has actually influenced the individual marital choices. We assume relative 
stability in conditions of ethnic marriage markets within a time span of five years. We also 




time of marriage, ensuring that the marriage market conditions are sufficiently exogenous to the 
individual marital choices. Correspondingly, we use the 2000 census data to compute the local 
concentration of Hui that have influenced the marital choices between 2000 and 2005. In total, 
we have 344 prefecture-level Hui concentrations. 
 
Other Control Variables: 
Age splines: we use spline functions for age to capture the non-linear change in the age effect. 
Specifically, we divide age into four groups: 15-19, 20-24, 25-29 and 30+. In order to accurately 
capture the age effect on marital choices at the time of marriage, we include the actual person-
year-specific age for those still single in 2005. However, for those who got married between 
2000 and 2005, we include their actual person-year-specific age till the year of marriage and set 
age fixed at age of marriage afterwards. Aside from the direct understanding of age effect, we 
can also take age as an indication of time to wait until marriage, that is, the “waiting time.” 
Education: we include it as years of schooling completed. We recode the years of 
schooling by: illiterate=3; primary school=6; junior high=9; senior high=12; associate degree=15; 
college and graduate school=17 (Xie and Hannum, 1996). This serves as an indicator of one’s 
socioeconomic status.  
Rural/urban status: we include a dummy variable with 0=urban and 1=rural to control for 
the salient rural-urban disparities in China (Wu and Treiman, 2004).  
 




In order to accurately specify the population under the influence of the local marriage market 
conditions, we restrict the sample to a relatively immobile, young and single-person-dominant 
population. We do not see this as a severe challenge to the validity of the results. On one hand, 
China is a country with tremendous internal migration, a number of which is driven by economic 
incentives with high economic uncertainty (Wu and Treiman, 2004). Correspondingly, those 
immobile individuals who are reluctant to migrate and remain at their places of origins tend to be 
more conservative and consequently are more likely to conform to existing norms. Therefore, 
their immobility should lead to higher prevalence of universal marriage and lower likelihood of 
exogamy. On the other hand, young people are often more open to social changes and are also 
more likely to challenge existing rules and norms (McCrae et al., 1999). Thus, the 
disproportionately higher percentage of young adults may predict lower marriage rates and a 
higher incidence of exogamy. We expect the above two forces of opposing directions to 
counteract with each other.  
 In the appendix, Appendix Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show descriptive statistics, respectively 
based on the analytical sample (the more restricted) and the descriptive sample (the less 
restricted), as aforementioned. As can be seen from Appendix Table 3.1, compared to those in 
Appendix Table 3.2, for both genders, percentages of exogamy are consistently lower while 
percentages of singleness are universally higher. This is consistent with our above speculations 
on the sample restrictions. First, the low residential mobility in the more restricted sample may 
indicate a disproportionately higher percentage of Hui who are more conservative than a typical 
Hui Muslim. Hence, they tend to remain single so as to avoid exogamy, which leads to the high 




that for those highly conservative Hui, norm of endogamy is stronger than the norm of universal 
marriage. Additionally, this sample includes a disproportionately high proportion of younger 
people. Although they may not choose singleness eventually, they may delay marriage for a 
while to stay away from exogamy. Therefore, we expect an underestimation of the ratio of 
exogamy over singleness with lower exogamy and higher singleness.  
Aside from the above differences, Appendix Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show similar patterns of 
variations in percentages of exogamy and singleness. Moreover, the distributions of other 
variables are also comparable. This indicates that except for the disproportionally higher 
percentage of immobile and young individuals, our more restricted analytical sample is a 
reasonable representation of the larger descriptive sample.   
 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
[TABLE 3.1 about here] 
Table 3.1 presents various marital outcomes by quartiles of the corresponding population 
distributions for Hui, separately for men and women. Specifically, to reflect the norm of 
universal and early marriage, we present percent never married by age 30, percent never married 
by age 25 and age at first marriage among all Hui, and to echo the norm of endogamy, we 
compute percent exogamy among married Hui. For both genders, percent exogamy among 
married Hui, percent never married by age 30, percent never married by age 25, and age at first 




increasing opportunities to meet potential spouses within Hui and the rising pressure based on 
Islam with higher Hui concentrations. 
At all quartiles of Hui concentration, women are much less likely than men to remain 
single both by ages 25 and 30, and tend to marry at a younger age than men do. Note that the 
variations in percent never married by both ages are much smaller for women than for men, 
across all levels of Hui concentrations, especially so for age 30. While the percent ranges from 
28.57 to 3.68 for men, the same range lies from 3.70 to 1.82 for women. This indicates that 
women are under a globally stronger constraint regarding the norm of universal marriage, which 
makes little room for the variation in Hui concentrations to take a sizable effect. Men, 
accordingly, are more responsive to the change in the contextual conditions. In places with lower 
Hui concentrations, they are so much freer to stay single than their female counterparts. Based on 
percent exogamy among married Hui, women are less likely to choose exogamy than men except 
in places with low Hui concentrations, though both the percentages and their changes with Hui 
concentration are highly similar across gender. In sum, the above comparisons indicate that 
compared to Hui men, Hui women are more severely constrained by the norm of universal and 
early marriage on a global basis, but may be equally restricted by the norm of endogamy. 
[FIGURE 3.1 about here] 
 In Figure 3.1, we provide a more systematic presentation of the relationship between 
various marital outcomes by showing the Kaplan-Meier survival curves of Hui’s marital choices 
across age and Hui concentration, respectively for men and women. Kaplan-Meier estimate is a 




observations still remaining single at time t, dt the number of observations getting married at 
time t. The Kaplan-Meier estimate of the survival function is:   




S t n d n

       (1) 
And the area below the curve shows the probability of remaining single. Specifically, in Figure 
3.1, the area under the lower curve shows the probability of remaining single, with dt being the 
number of observations getting married at time t, and the area under the upper curve shows the 
probability of either remaining single or choosing exogamy, with dt denoting the number of 
observations choosing endogamy at time t. Correspondingly, the gap between the two curves 
presents the probability of choosing exogamy. The patterns shown are consistent with the results 
in Table 3.1. With a higher Hui concentration, both percent married and percent endogamy are 
higher while percent exogamy is lower. Moreover, single Hui “drain out” much faster with 
shorter “waiting time” in places with higher Hui concentrations, as demonstrated by the steeper 
drop of the curves. Compared to men, women consistently have higher percent married, higher 
percent endogamy, lower percent exogamy, and shorter “waiting time.”       
[FIGURE 3.2 about here] 
[TABLE 3.2 about here] 
To gain a clearer understanding, in Figure 3.2, we present the province-level distribution 
of Hui concentrations, percent never married by age 30 among Hui, age at first marriage for Hui, 
and percent exogamy among married Hui. Consistent with the patterns shown in Table 3.1, in 
places with higher Hui concentrations, percent exogamy, percent never married by age 30 and 
age at first marriage are all lower. Table 3.2 shows the correlations between the aggregate-level 




province level, are all negative. That is, both sets of results at the aggregate level in Figure 3.2 
and Table 3.2 show similar patterns to those at the individual level, as shown in Table 3.1 and 
Figure 3.1. This indicates the robustness of the results.   
 
3.4.2 Marry or not? 
[TABLE 3.3 about here] 
Table 3.3 shows results for the marital outcome of married or single, i.e., the total marriage rate, 
respectively for men and women. As can be seen from Models 1-M and 1-F, for both men and 
women, local concentration of Hui has positive effects on the logged odds of married over single. 
If we test on the gender difference, while the intercept is significantly larger for women than for 
men, the coefficient on the Hui concentration is significantly smaller. This echoes the patterns 
shown in Table 3.1. That is, women are more strictly constrained by the norm of universal 
marriage than men, regardless of the contextual conditions, and this leaves little room for their 
marriage rates to vary across Hui concentrations. However, with their larger variation in 
marriage rates, men’s decisions on whether to marry are more responsive to the changing 
marriage market conditions.  
 Changes in the coefficients across age splines are similar for men and women. That is, 
before age 30, age promotes marriage with decreasing slopes; however, after age 30, Hui are less 
likely to get married with aging. In terms of magnitudes, the coefficients on the age splines of 
15-19 and 20-24, the primary age range of mate selection, are significantly smaller for women, 
showing weaker promotion effects of aging for marriage. This should also be due to women’s 




 While years of schooling have no significant influence on the total marriage rate for men, 
women with higher education are less likely to get married. This may indicate a more liberal 
attitude toward marriage due to higher education. However, if this is the case, it is surprising 
why this does not show for men. Therefore, it is more possible that highly educated women face 
an even more restricted pool of potential marriage candidates than their lower educated women 
counterparts, especially considering the taboo of exogamy for Muslims. If this is the case, it 
implies a stronger norm of endogamy confronted by Muslim women than their male counterparts. 
 
3.4.3  Endogamy or exogamy? Endogamy and exogamy as a choice conditional on getting 
married   
Aside from the norm of universal marriage, another norm of marriage based on Islam is that of 
endogamy. As aforementioned, for the choice of exogamy, we need to consider the 
heterogeneities among individuals. While some of them are fortunate enough to realize their 
marital preferences by finding the partner of their preferred type, and will only be confronted 
with the choice between endogamy and exogamy conditional on getting married, some others 
may see endogamy and exogamy as independent alternatives to being single. Accordingly, we 
apply two modeling approaches to capture these two types of individuals.  
              For those who have succeeded in finding the spouses of their preferred type, that is, 
those who consider endogamy and exogamy as a choice conditional on getting married, we use 
the outcome variable of exogamy versus endogamy with binary logit models. Models 2-M and 2-
F show results based on this approach. For both men and women, coefficients on Hui 




marital preferences, conditional on getting married, endogamy is definitely the dominant option. 
In addition, women’s coefficient on Hui concentration, though larger, is not significantly 
different from that of men. This means that men and women are equally constrained by the norm 
of endogamy.  
Moreover, while highly educated men are more likely to pursue exogamy over endogamy, 
the coefficient on years of schooling not only is insignificant, but is negative for women. 
Although the gender difference is not significant, this provides some support for the 
interpretation that even highly educated women find it hard to escape from the normative 
pressure to marry within Hui. This, again, implies a stronger norm of endogamy faced by women.  
 
3.4.4 Endogamy or exogamy? Endogamy and exogamy as independent alternatives to being 
single   
[TABLE 3.4 about here] 
However, there are yet other people who are not as fortunate to find their preferred spouses. Due 
to the potential competition between the norm of universal marriage and the norm of endogamy, 
they may place exogamy and endogamy as parallel options to being single. How will they 
respond to varying contextual conditions? Table 3.4 shows results from the discrete-time hazard 
models with the pair of outcome variables, endogamy or singleness, and exogamy or singleness, 
separately for men and women. This set of models is based on the assumption that endogamy 
and exogamy are independent alternatives to being single. As can be seen from Models 3-M and 
3-F, for both men and women, the coefficients on local concentration of Hui for the logged odds 




However, as we move to Models 4-M and 4-F, the coefficient on Hui concentration for 
the logged odds of exogamy over singleness, though negative for both genders, is only 
significant for women. Moreover, the gender difference is not significant, which means the 
significant depression effect of Hui concentration on choosing exogamy for women may not be 
robust, especially considering its low significance level. This implies the coexistence of and the 
competition between the two norms. That is, in places with higher Hui concentrations, both the 
norm of universal marriage and the norm of endogamy get stronger. While some Hui may stay 
single for a possible endogamy in the future, others may sacrifice the religious purity so as to get 
married at all. Therefore, especially for those who place endogamy, exogamy and singleness as 
parallel options, at the aggregate level, the link between Hui concentration and the choice 
between exogamy and singleness is uncertain and indefinite.  
To put things in perspective, note that in Table 3.3, the coefficients on Hui concentration 
in Models 2-M and 2-F not only are both significantly negative, but also are with higher 
significance levels than that in Model 4-F. Combined with the insignificant coefficient in Model 
4-M, this comparison indicates that the choice between exogamy and delay of 
marriage/singleness is less evident and definitive than the choice between exogamy and 
endogamy. To be more concrete, for those who are fortunate enough to find the spouse of their 
preferred type, when the opportunities to meet their potential spouses increase and when the 
norm of endogamy gets stronger in places with higher Hui concentrations, he or she is definitely 
more likely to marry within Hui, rather than out of Hui. However, for those who are still in the 
process of mate selection, when caught by both norm of universal marriage and norm of 




choose. Should they further delay marriage or even stay single for good so as to avoid exogamy? 
Or should they get married anyway, disregarding the ethnicity of the spouse, so as to fulfill the 
norm of universal and young marriage? The competition between the two norms may lead to 
both positive and negative links running from Hui concentrations to the logged odds of exogamy 
over singleness, which result in the less significant results in Models 4-M and 4-F. 
In addition, the coefficients on years of schooling show gender differences for both 
outcomes. As shown, for the logged odds of endogamy over singleness, the coefficients on years 
of schooling are both negative for men and women, though only significant for the latter. And 
the gender difference is significant. Similar to that for the outcome of married versus singleness, 
this could indicate the shrunk “pool of eligibles” for highly educated Muslim women. 
Nevertheless, for the logged odds of exogamy over singleness, the coefficient on years of 
schooling is only significant for men, though positive for both genders. Again, the gender 
difference is significant. This result shows that education plays a lesser role in women’s 
tendency to choose exogamy over singleness than education for men. This implies that even for 
highly educated women, norm of endogamy is still a taboo that can hardly be overridden. This 
provides some evidence for the expectation that women are more constrained by the norm of 
endogamy than men. Lastly, coefficients on age show similar patterns for men and women, 
except for those younger age groups, which could also be due to the sample distribution 
characteristics.     
 




This paper examines how Hui’s marital choices among endogamy, exogamy and singleness vary 
across conditions of local ethnic marriage markets. Specifically, we explore the relative strength 
of the two norms regarding marriage for Hui Muslims – universal marriage, and endogamy. We 
also examine how the restrictiveness of the norms differs for men and women. We measure 
conditions of the local marriage market by prefecture-level concentrations of Hui. We investigate 
the influence of local Hui concentration on various marital choices using both the discrete-time 
event history models and the binary logit model, based on a random sample of the China 2005 
mini-census data. In order to reflect the actual marriage market conditions that have influenced 
the marital outcomes, China census in 2000 is used to measure the local contextual conditions.  
 Both the descriptive and analytical results show that in places with higher Hui 
concentrations, Hui tend to have higher marriage rates, marry earlier and more endogamously, 
for both men and women. For the choice of exogamy, there are some nuances in the results. 
Specifically, conditional on being married, the logged odds of exogamy over endogamy is 
significantly lower in places with higher Hui concentrations; nevertheless, if we put exogamy as 
an alternative to being single, coefficient on the logged odds of exogamy over singleness is only 
significant for women with a low significance level. This indicates the coexistence of and the 
competition between the two norms.  
For the comparison across gender, women have consistently higher marriage rates than 
men, regardless of the level of Hui concentrations. This means that women are constrained more 
strictly by the norm of universal marriage than men on a global basis, although men are more 
responsive to the change in Hui concentrations with their larger variation in marriage rates. 




show no significant gender difference, which implies that men and women are equally restricted 
by the norm of endogamy. However, the coefficients on education lend some insight on the 
gender differences in the implementation of the norm of endogamy. While higher education can 
bring women some freedom to stay single, it is not associated with more exogamy for them. Men 
with higher education, on the other hand, are more likely to pursue exogamy. This may be due to 
the fact that exogamy is a more prohibitive taboo for women than for men (Khairabadi, 1982). 
There are some limitations in this study. First, although we try to provide some 
theoretical implications for the relative strengths of the two norms of marriage, which sheds 
some light on a cultural perspective of the contextual effects, we still cannot directly test between 
the two norms, or between the structural and cultural influences. The existing research strategies 
can hardly work for Hui considering the limited data availability of them. Secondly, as discussed 
earlier, our sample is composed of disproportionately higher percentages of young, single and 
immobile population. Although we do not think this is a problem, it is still useful to assess our 
research questions based on a more representative sample. At this time, handy solutions to this 
issue are not available, due to the small percentage of Hui population and the active internal 
migration in China. Thirdly, as shown in the Appendix Table 3.2, type of exogamy, i.e., exogamy 
with different ethnic groups may have varying links with marriage market conditions. Again, due 
to the data limitations, this more nuanced analysis is not possible at the time. All the above 
limitations can serve as future research agenda when sufficient data become available. Last, 
marital choices could be affected by multiple individual characteristics (Kalmijn, 1991, 1998) 
and people may match on various traits with different priorities (e.g., Davis, 1941; Fishman et al., 




1989). In the future, we can study how other domains of assortative mating (for example, 
marriage market, education, occupation, and language) influence the patterns of marital choices, 
aside from ethnicity.   
This study has contributed to the literature of marriage and family, gender inequality and 
Chinese ethnicity. Not only has it examined the contextual influence on individuals’ marital 
choices on a unique Chinese Muslim group, it has also facilitated a cultural perspective by 
evaluating the relative strength of the two norms regarding marriage, through the comparison 
between the relative likelihood of different marital outcomes across Hui concentration and 
gender. The abovementioned limitations will serve as good starting points for the future 
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Low-Q1 0.05 35.00 28.57 25.04 74.07 0.04 14.29 3.70 22.93 75.86
Medium Low-Q2 0.10 27.85 13.56 24.75 60.00 0.09 12.31 3.57 23.59 60.00
Medium High-Q3 0.48 16.41 9.94 24.39 32.62 0.45 7.02 1.95 22.82 31.18
High-Q4 3.88 9.07 3.68 22.73 8.32 3.98 4.33 1.82 20.78 7.84
All 1.13 10.56 4.86 22.96 12.18 1.14 4.85 1.88 21.04 11.51
Table 3.1. Distribution of Hui's Marital Outcomes by Quartiles of Hui Concentration Level
So urce : China  2005 1% Inter-Cens us  Survey.                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
No te : All s ta tis tics  are  ca lcula ted bas ed o n a  larger s ample  with res tric tio n to  po pula tio n aged 15-50. N=1,005,158. % Hui amo ng lo ca l po pula tio n is  ca lcula ted by dividing 
po pula tio n o f Hui by the  to ta l lo ca l po pula tio n. % nerver married by age  25, % nerver married by age  30 and age  a t firs t marriage  a re  calcula ted amo ng po pula tio n o f Hui. % 
Exo gamy amo ng married is  co mputed as  percent exo gamy amo ng a ll married Hui.











































% Never Married by Age 30 Age at 1st Marriage %Exogamy among Married
Prefecture-level -0.0423 -0.3188 -0.1460
Province-level -0.2318 -0.5922 -0.3838
Table 3.2. Correlations between Concentration of Hui and Hui's Marital Outcomes
So urce : China 2005 1% Inter-Cens us  Survey.                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
No te : All s ta tis tics  are  calcula ted bas ed o n a  la rger s ample  with res tric tio n to  po pulatio n aged 15-50. N=1,005,158. Co ncentra tio n o f Hui is  ca lcula ted 
by dividing po pula tio n o f Hui by the  to ta l lo ca l po pula tio n. % nerver married by age  30 and age  a t firs t marriage  a re  ca lcula ted amo ng po pula tio n o f 


















2.691 *** -3.816 ** 1.249 ** -6.085 *** -1.442 ** -3.419
(0.340) (1.430) (0.363) (1.706) (0.497) (2.794)
Age Splines
1.837 *** 12.752 *** 0.973 *** 1.177 ** -0.863 * -10.956 ***
(0.355) (0.035) (0.099) (0.453) (0.369) (0.053)
0.350 *** 0.459 *** 0.220 *** 0.380 *** -0.129 * 0.020
(0.041) (0.124) (0.036) (0.093) (0.055) (0.189)
0.070 † 0.155 † 0.052 0.012 -0.017 -0.271
(0.038) (0.080) (0.050) (0.094) (0.063) (0.172)
-0.187 *** -0.196 * -0.289 *** -0.121 -0.102 1.236
(0.045) (0.091) (0.082) (0.093) (0.094) (0.703)
0.014 0.071 † -0.088 *** -0.019 -0.102 *** 0.042
(0.016) (0.039) (0.017) (0.040) (0.023) (0.079)
0.128 -0.574 -0.006 -0.533 -0.133 0.311
(0.133) (0.389) (0.144) (0.410) (0.196) (0.638)
-39.929 *** -260.162 -21.138 *** -26.471 ** 18.789 *** 219.103








Table 3.3. Local Marriage Market Conditions and Marital Choices for Hui:                                                            





Model 1-M Model 2-M
359 367
Model 1-F Model 2-F









Model 1 Model 2
Married /Single Exogamy/Endogamy
5,203 726
Note: The top entries are logit  coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Models 1-M and 1-F show results from the discrete-time hazard models; 












3.075 *** -0.873 1.500 *** -3.380 * -1.575 ** -2.508
(0.363) (1.321) (0.386) (1.630) (0.530) (2.098)
Age Splines
1.853 *** 11.146 *** 0.966 *** 13.178 *** -0.886 * 2.430 ***
(0.357) (0.046) (0.099) (1.630) (0.370) (0.057)
0.323 *** 0.775 *** 0.180 *** 0.465 *** -0.143 * -0.310
(0.043) (0.166) (0.040) (0.096) (0.059) (0.192)
0.023 0.164 * 0.030 0.059 0.007 -0.105
(0.045) (0.074) (0.063) (0.082) (0.077) (0.111)
-0.226 *** -0.141 * -0.507 ** -0.166 † -0.281 -0.025
(0.061) (0.066) (0.172) (0.086) (0.182) (0.109)
-0.010 0.126 *** -0.114 *** 0.010 -0.104 *** -0.116 *
(0.018) (0.035) (0.019) (0.038) (0.026) (0.052)
0.171 -0.430 -0.038 -0.199 -0.208 0.231
(0.145) (0.390) (0.156) (0.419) (0.213) (0.572)
-40.100 *** -221.036 -20.835 *** -255.916 19.265 ** -42.454





Table 3.4. Local Marriage Market Conditions and Marital Choices for Hui: Endogamy and Exogamy as Independent Alternatives to Being Single
Source: China 2005 1% Inter-Census Survey.                                                                                                                                                            
Note: The top entries are logit  coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses. Models 3-M, 3-F, 4-M and 4-F show results from the discrete-
time hazard models. †p<0.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 (two-tailed tests).                                                                                                         
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Single 0.860 0.347 0.872 0.334 0.847 0.360
Endogamy 0.112 0.316 0.103 0.304 0.123 0.330
Exogamy 0.027 0.162 0.025 0.156 0.030 0.170
Single 0.860 0.347 0.872 0.334 0.847 0.360
Endogamy 0.112 0.316 0.103 0.304 0.123 0.329
Exogamy with other 9 Muslim minority 0.001 0.028 0.001 0.038 NA NA
Exogamy with 45 non-Muslim minority 0.014 0.117 0.004 0.065 0.025 0.156
Exogamy with Han 0.012 0.111 0.019 0.137 0.005 0.068
Local concentration of Hui 0.167 0.172 0.164 0.169 0.171 0.174
Categorical Concentration-Q1 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.008 0.005
Concentration-Q2 0.039 0.024 0.039 0.024 0.039 0.023
Concentration-Q3 0.198 0.057 0.199 0.056 0.199 0.059
Concentration-Q4 0.423 0.076 0.423 0.076 0.424 0.076
20.620 5.368 21.148 5.786 20.003 4.761
Categorical Age 15-19 0.528 0.499 0.495 0.500 0.566 0.496
Age 20-24 0.275 0.446 0.272 0.445 0.278 0.448
Age 25-29 0.129 0.336 0.146 0.353 0.110 0.313
Age 30+ 0.068 0.252 0.087 0.282 0.045 0.208
9.453 3.463 9.507 3.228 9.389 3.719
Categorical Never attend school 0.070 0.255 0.047 0.213 0.096 0.294
Primary school 0.211 0.408 0.207 0.405 0.216 0.411
Junior high school 0.373 0.484 0.410 0.492 0.329 0.470
Senior high school 0.224 0.417 0.229 0.420 0.220 0.414
Associate college/above 0.122 0.327 0.107 0.309 0.140 0.347
Rural 0.483 0.500 0.488 0.500 0.478 0.500
Urban 0.517 0.500 0.512 0.500 0.522 0.500
Years of Schooling
Registration of Residence
Source: China 2005 1% Inter-Census Survey. 
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Single 0.397 0.489 0.427 0.495 0.366 0.482
Endogamy 0.532 0.499 0.503 0.500 0.561 0.496
Exogamy 0.071 0.258 0.070 0.255 0.073 0.260
            
Single 0.397 0.489 0.427 0.495 0.366 0.482
Endogamy 0.532 0.499 0.503 0.500 0.561 0.496
Exogamy with other 9 Muslim minority 0.004 0.063 0.008 0.087 0.000 0.013
Exogamy with 45 non-Muslim minority 0.036 0.187 0.013 0.115 0.060 0.238
Exogamy with Han 0.031 0.173 0.049 0.215 0.013 0.112
                                 
Local concentration of Hui 0.172 0.169 0.170 0.168 0.174 0.170
Categorical Concentration-Q1 0.009 0.005 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.005
Concentration-Q2 0.049 0.034 0.049 0.034 0.049 0.033
Concentration-Q3 0.213 0.053 0.213 0.053 0.212 0.053
Concentration-Q4 0.419 0.076 0.419 0.076 0.419 0.076
30.235 10.712 30.294 10.785 30.175 10.636
Categorical Age 15-19 0.242 0.429 0.241 0.428 0.244 0.429
Age 20-24 0.131 0.337 0.135 0.342 0.127 0.333
Age 25-29 0.107 0.309 0.106 0.308 0.107 0.310
Age 30+ 0.520 0.500 0.518 0.500 0.522 0.500
          
9.453 3.463 9.507 3.228 9.389 3.719
Categorical Never attend school 0.152 0.359 0.091 0.287 0.216 0.411
Primary school 0.259 0.438 0.262 0.440 0.257 0.437
Junior high school 0.324 0.468 0.374 0.484 0.272 0.445
Senior high school 0.169 0.375 0.180 0.384 0.158 0.365
Associate college/above 0.061 0.240 0.060 0.238 0.062 0.242
                                   
Rural 0.497 0.500 0.499 0.500 0.494 0.500
Urban 0.503 0.500 0.501 0.500 0.506 0.500
Registration of Residence
Source: China 2005 1% Inter-Census Survey. 
Note: All statistics are calculated based on a larger sample with restriction to Hui population aged 15-50. N=11,400.
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Motherhood Penalty and Fatherhood Premium?  
Gender Disparities in Fertility Effects in China 
4.1 Introduction 
The relationship between fertility and employment outcomes is a crucial issue at the intersection 
of family and career lives (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Goldin, 1995; Gough and Noonan, 2013).  
The negative link between childbearing and labor force participation has been established by an 
array of empirical studies (e.g., Budig and England, 2001; Glauber, 2007; Goldin, 1995; Gronau, 
1988; Korenman and Neumark, 1992). Some studies have further argued that due to the within-
household specialization, fathers tend to devote more effort to bread-earning while mothers 
assume more responsibilities at home for nursing and nurturing the children (Becker, 1981, 1985; 
Glauber, 2007, 2008; Killewald and Gough, 2013). Therefore, as mothers are established to 
suffer from a “motherhood penalty” within the labor market (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Glauber, 
2008; Harkness and Waldfogel, 2003; Hochschild and Machung, 1989; Joshi and Newell, 1989; 
Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Neumark and Korenman, 1994; Noonan, 2001; Waldfogel, 1997, 
1998a, 1998b), number of children is supposed to have no or even positive impact on father’s 
labor force participation (Killewald, 2013; Loh, 1996; Lundberg and Rose, 2000), that is, the 




However, the causal interpretation of the associations between fertility and labor force 
participation has been controversial considering the strong theoretical rationales that the fertility 
level and labor supply are jointly determined (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Goldin, 1995; Gough 
and Noonan, 2013; Schultz, 1981). In the first place, parents and non-parents, as well as parents 
with more and fewer children, can be different in observed and unobserved characteristics, such 
as career motivation, family values and sense of responsibility, that relate to both childbearing 
and labor market outcomes (Budig and England, 2001; Gough and Noonan, 2013). Moreover, 
not only fertility may influence the labor supply outcomes of the parents, it is also possible that 
individuals make decisions about childbearing based on their labor force participation 
performance. For example, when one is more active and successful occupationally, they are more 
likely to be economically prepared and thus are more ready to have more children. That is, the 
established fertility effects could merely be due to selection, rather than actual causality. 
Instrumental variables strategy (IV) is among the most powerful methods to address this issue 
considering the prevalence of randomness in fertility behaviors. Since an instrumental variable is 
supposed to be strongly correlated with the independent variable, its randomness guarantees that 
it only influences the dependent variable through its association with the independent variable. 
Thus, the potentially endogenous independent variable is purged of its non-causal correlation 
with the dependent variable, and the more accurate causal effects are estimated. One successful 
example in this line of research is Angrist and Evans’s (1998) application of the IV strategy 
based on the sex composition of the first two births and the multiple second births in families 




China is an ideal research setting to test the “motherhood penalty” and the “fatherhood 
premium,” in both theoretical and methodological regards. From the theoretical perspective, 
China is a country with high-speed economic growth (Hauser and Xie, 2005; Xie and Hannum, 
1996; Xie et al., 2013). During this process, women’s social and economic status has improved 
tremendously. Two major demonstrations of women’s upgraded social positions are the 
prevalence of female labor force participation and the decline in the within-household 
specialization (Lavely et al., 1990; Oppenheimer, 1997; Smock, Manning and Gupta, 1999; Wu 
and Song, 2010). Hence, in contemporary China, whether the contrast between “motherhood 
penalty” and “fatherhood premium” still holds is uncertain and begs empirical examinations 
(Bian, Shu, and Logan, 2000; Whyte and Parish, 1984; Wolf, 1984; Zuo and Bian, 2001).  
From the methodological perspective, the differential implementation of the “one-child 
policy” in China provides a powerful instrumental variable. China’s “one-child policy” was 
initiated around 1978 to 1980. It officially restricted the married couples to having only one child. 
However, the actual implementation of the policy varies with gender of the first-born child (Guo, 
Liu and Song, 2001). Specifically, individuals in the specified areas with their first child being a 
girl can exempt from the “one-child policy” and are allowed to have a second child.16 Since 
gender of birth is generally considered to be randomly assigned,17 after restricting the sample to 
the population who were influenced by this “exemption” policy, gender of the first child can 
work as a powerful instrumental variable for whether to have more than one child. By applying 
the IV approach, we are able to provide a causal estimate of the fertility effects. 
                                                            
16 For details of the policy, please refer to Appendix Table 4.1. 




 Moreover, among the numerous studies on “motherhood penalty” and “fatherhood 
premium,” most of them exclusively focus on the fertility effect on employment and financial 
outcomes. However, family, as one of the most important terrains in individuals’ lives, may 
impose more comprehensive and penetrating influences. Specifically, fertility behaviors may 
change the parents’ entire life including their time use plans and subjective well-being, aside 
from the conventional labor market outcomes (Waite and Gallagher, 2000). If this is the case, the 
“motherhood penalty” and “fatherhood premium” may not necessarily hold. First of all, as a 
crucial fulfillment of life, having more children may compensate the parents subjectively. 
Secondly, if anything, mothers, often as the one interacting most with the children, may reap the 
most of the “subjective premium” (Waite and Gallagher, 2000). Hence, without examining the 
fertility effects on other outcomes, aside from the labor market outcomes, we cannot obtain a full 
understanding on how individuals’ fertility level may change their lives. 
Specifically, our research questions are: 
(1) Does having more than one child influence the parents’ time use, income, and 
subjective well-being in China? 
(2) If yes, how are the effects different for fathers and mothers? 
To sum up, using the nationally-representative 2010 Chinese Family Panel Studies 
(CFPS), this paper examines the gender-specific effects of fertility on a variety of outcomes 
including parents’ time use, income and subjective well-being, based on the IV approach. Our 
main contribution is to provide an evaluation of the causal link running from fertility to both time 





4.2 Theoretical issues and research setting 
4.2.1 “Motherhood penalty” and “fatherhood premium”                                                                                         
Under the model of within-household specialization, couples pursue a joint strategy in which 
they divide labor to maximize the household-level well-being (Becker, 1981, 1985). The division 
of labor is usually based on the comparative advantage of the spouses. Due to the gender gap in 
labor market outcomes and the socialized skills by gender, men are often supposed to assume the 
role of bread-earners, and women are accordingly, take the responsibility as home-makers 
(Corcoran and Courant, 1987). Thus, specialization serves as the dominant causal explanation for 
women’s “motherhood penalty” and men’s “fatherhood premium” regarding labor market 
outcomes (Budig and England, 2001; Glauber, 2008; Gough and Noonan, 2013; Killewald and 
Gough, 2013; Noonan and Corcoran, 2004; Walfogel, 1997). 
 However, the causality from childbearing to labor market outcomes has been 
controversial. Many studies argued that the established fertility effects could just be due to 
selection (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Budig and England, 2001; Gough and Noonan, 2013; 
Jacobsen, Pearce and Rosenbloom, 1999; Korenman and Neumark, 1992; Lundberg and Rose, 
2000; Miller, 2011; Waldfogel, 1997). First, individuals who decide to become parents may 
differ from those non-parents in ways that are related to the labor market outcomes, such as 
career aspirations, work commitment, family values and sense of responsibility (Budig and 
England, 2001; Gough and Noonan, 2013). Second, individuals may make decisions on their 
fertility behaviors based on their labor market and financial situations (Angrist and Evans, 1998; 
Gough and Noonan, 2013). For example, when the employment status of a woman of 




and mothers. However, men, to the contrary, may decide to have (more) children when they are 
getting economically established. That is, the actual causality may run from labor market 
outcomes to the fertility decisions. 
Studies aiming to address this selection bias have mostly done so either by directly 
controlling for possible differences between the parents and non-parents, or by exploiting a 
longitudinal structure of the dataset (Becker, 1985; Blank, 1990; Budig and England, 2001; Hill, 
1979; Korenman and Neumark, 1992; Lundberg and Rose, 2000; Waldfogel, 1997). However, it 
is hard to sufficiently and accurately identify the relevant observed differences between the 
parents and non-parents, or parents with more and fewer children. It is even harder to control for 
the unobserved characteristics. Additionally, a longitudinal design in data is highly complicated 
and costly and is often of low availability. Comparatively, among various methods dealing with 
the selection bias, instrumental variable strategy is considered one of the most powerful (Angrist 
and Evans, 1998). Nevertheless, an instrumental variable that is sufficiently exogenous to the 
outcome variable often requires settings of natural experiments or rigorous treatment designs, 
thus is difficult to find. Moreover, this method is mostly applied in economic studies and has 
rarely been used in sociological work (e.g., Angrist and Evans, 1998; Jacobsen et al., 1999; 
Miller, 2011).  
 Furthermore, as discussed above, the fertility effects have mainly been established for 
employment and financial outcomes (Angrist and Evans, 1998; Budig and England, 2001; 
Glauber, 2007, 2008; Hill, 1979; Killewald, 2013; Killewald and Gough, 2013; Waldfogel, 1997). 
However, as childbearing and childrearing are such important events in one’s life course, it 




levels of their subjective well-being (Waite and Gallagher, 2000). However, studies on the 
fertility effects on those outcomes have been rare (Waite and Gallagher, 2000). 
 
4.2.2 The Chinese context 
Chinese society is one that has been undergoing dramatic social changes (Xie et al., 2013). Two 
most salient among the variety of changes are women’s upgraded social status (Hannum, 2005; 
Treiman, 2013; Wu and Song, 2010; Wu and Zhang, 2010; Zhang, Hannum, and Wang, 2008) 
and the evolution of China’s one-child policy (Greenhalgh, 2008; Gu et al., 2007; Guo et al., 
2001). Those two changes qualify China as an ideal research setting to examine the fertility 
effects, from both theoretical and methodological perspectives.  
Theoretically, due to the Communist revolution and the government’s enthusiastic 
promotion of the ideology on gender equality, women’s social status has upgraded tremendously 
(Lavely et al., 1990). The People’s Republic of China was founded in 1949 after the Communist 
Revolution. For the first 30 years, the Communist ideology regarding equality had been 
zealously promulgated, among which women’s parity to men had been highlighted (Meisner, 
1999; Parish, 1981; Whyte, 2010; Yu and Xie, 2013). The slogan “women hold up half the sky” 
(“fu nv neng ding ban bian tian”) had dominated the mainstream discourse (Mauer-Fazio, 
Rawski, and Zhang, 1999). In the sphere of political and work life, the Chinese constitution 
guarantees women equal rights with men in all aspects of life and endorses the policy of “same-
work, same-pay” (“tong gong tong chou”) (Mauer-Fazio et al., 1999; Zuo and Bian, 2001). In the 
sphere of family life, in 1950, China instituted the Marriage Law, which formally legalized free-




of husbands (China Administration Council, 1950: Item 5; Zuo and Bian, 2001). Throughout this 
process, women’s social standing and economic status have both significantly improved 
(Hannum, 2005; Lavely et al., 1990; Song, 2009; Zhang et al., 2008). In education, women’s 
attainment has gradually caught up with that of men (Treiman, 2013; Wu and Song, 2010: Table 
2; Wu and Zhang, 2010). In employment, the gender gap in income and labor force participation 
has declined and the occupational distribution across gender has changed in favor of women 
(Meng, 1993; Parish and Busse, 1998). During the same process, gender inequality within the 
household had been dramatically reduced and within-household specialization had been largely 
eroded in contemporary China (Bian et al., 2000; Whyte and Parish, 1984; Wolf, 1984; Zuo and 
Bian, 2001). Correspondingly, the contrast between the “motherhood penalty” and the 
“fatherhood premium” may have lost its primary foundation to prevail. Thus, it is necessary to 
empirically examine the gender-specific fertility effects under this new circumstance of the 
gender power structure within the household.  
Methodologically, as aforementioned, IV strategy is among the most powerful 
approaches to address the selection bias issue with the suitable instrumental variable in hand. 
The exemption policy to the one-child policy in China provides us with such a candidate. The 
“one-child policy” in China was initiated around 1978 and 1980 and it officially restricted 
married couples to having only one child (Greenhalgh, 2008; Guo et al., 2001). However, this 
initial version of the policy was too drastic and inflexible, and it ignored the potential 
heterogeneities in fertility intentions and behaviors across regions and across the urban-rural 
divide (Guo et al., 2001). For example, Chinese society has historically maintained a patriarchal 




over female offspring (Thornton and Lin, 1994; Xu, Ji and Tung, 2000; Whyte, 2003). These 
family values have been reserved with disproportionately higher rates in rural areas (Guo et al., 
2001). Accordingly, in 1988, the one-child policy was tailored to accommodate those contextual 
specificities (Guo et al., 2001). Among the changes, the most salient adjustment is to implement 
the one child policy according to the gender of the first-born child. Specifically, individuals in 
the specified areas, most of which are rural, with their first child being a girl can exempt from the 
one-child policy and are allowed to have a second child (Gu et al., 2007; Guo et al., 2001). 
Therefore, parents whose first child is a girl are substantially more likely to go on to have an or 
more additional child(ren).18 Since gender of birth is virtually randomly assigned, a dummy 
variable for whether the first-born child is a girl provides a plausible instrumental variable for 
further childbearing among parents with at least one child. By using the IV approach, we are able 
to evaluate the causal effect of fertility, which seems unlikely to obtain through regular OLS 
regression analysis. 
  
4.3 Data and methods 
This study utilizes the IV approach to examine the gender-specific fertility effects on the parents’ 
time use, income and subjective well-being outcomes, based on a sample from the nationally 
representative 2010 Chinese Family Panel Studies (CFPS). CFPS covers a wide range of 
information on individuals’ social and economic activities, family backgrounds and subjective 
outcomes. Specifically, we use the adult sample for the parents’ information, and derive the 
                                                            




children’s, the spouses’, and the grandparents’ information by linking the adult sample to the 
family relationship sample.  
 
4.3.1  Analytical Sample 
Based on the adult sample and the linked information from the family relationship sample, we 
first restrict the dataset to those who have at least on child. Then to secure the basic validity of 
the analysis, we only keep those who have eligible values for all the independent variables, 
including the endogenous variables, the instrumental variable, and the control variables. After 
these restrictions, to guarantee the relevance and comparability of the outcome variables across 
individuals, we further restrict the sample to those aged between 20 and 50 (20 and 50 included), 
which age range covers the prime working ages, as well as to those who have not yet retired.  
Then, regarding the childbearing behavior, since number of children will mainly 
influence the parents when the children are relatively young and require care, we restrict the 
sample to those whose first child is at or under age 18. This restriction to the parents of younger 
children also ensures the childbearing decisions were made under the influence of the exemption 
policy. Additionally, since the data do not include information on the marital parity of the 
respondent’s spouse, to maximally ensure that the focal couples are the biological parents of the 
children, we further restrict the sample to those both who themselves and whose spouses are 
married and those who are in their first marriages at the time of the survey.   
Finally, regarding the exemption policy, we make the restriction to only include those 
rural parents living in provinces where they can have a second child if the first child is a girl and 




parents who are the ethnic majority Han, considering the fact that ethnic minorities living in rural 
areas are mostly allowed to have at least two children (China State Ethnic Affairs Commission, 
1999). Furthermore, to maximally exploit the sample whose sample size is limited after the long 
list of restrictions so as to get more reliable results, we conduct single imputations for all the 
outcome variables with predicted values from regressions with the control variables as listed in 
“Section 3.3 Variables.” These procedures of restrictions and imputations leave us with 1,124 
fathers and 868 mothers.  
As shown in Appendix Table 4.1, aside from the residential registration status, there are 
also other conditions under which the exemption policy based on gender of the first child can be 
applied. However, due to lack of the relevant information, we cannot make sample restrictions 
accounting for all the conditions. As a robustness check, we have experimented with different 
versions of sample restrictions based on the maximally retrievable information from the CFPS 
dataset, and the results remain highly consistent. Therefore, we do not think the sample 
restrictions we applied for the analytical sample will invalidate the results. 
 
4.3.2  Instrumental Variable (IV) approach 
Instrumental variable approach is among the most powerful methods to deal with the selection 
bias issue in establishing causality. Concretely, the instrumental variable is a variable that affects 
the endogenous variable, while not affecting the outcome variable other than through its effect 
on the endogenous variable, and the causal effect is estimated by the two-stage least squares 




more than one child as X, and whether the first child is a girl as Z, then a reduced form model 
gives us the direct influence of having a girl first on the parent’s monthly income: 






    (1) 
 However, we can notice that this reduced form model does not provide any theoretically 
substantive interpretations. Instead, we are more interested in a structural parameter, namely the 
coefficient indicating the fertility effect on the parent’s monthly income. That parameter should 
appear in the structural equation as: 





     (2) 
Based on the notations in (1) and (2), the coefficient from the reduced form model in (1) 
may also be written as: 
1 1( )*( ) ( )*
X Y X
Z X Z
    
  
     (3) 
 It is most desirable if we can directly estimate the structural model in (2), given that the 
assignment to X is random. However, this can hardly be the case. For instance, those parents 
who are more family oriented tend to have more children, and they are also more likely to earn 
more. Thus, the causal effects estimated by the structural model in (2) may be contaminated by 
the selection bias and instead we should estimate the fertility effect indirectly using IV. 
For a clearer illustration, in Figure 4.1, we present IV’s working mechanisms. The 
structural model in (2) is shown as the one in the dashed box. That is, there could be some 
unobserved characteristics in the residual εi that have an impact on both Xi and Yi. In the above 




to have more children (Xi), and at the meantime to pursue better economic positions (Yi) so as to 
provide better for the family. This results in a selection bias in the relationship between Xi and Yi. 
The IV, gender of the first child (Zi), as demonstrated by Figure 4.1, is exogenous to this 
endogenous relationship. Through its association with whether having more than one child and 
given the association between whether having more than one child and the parent’s monthly 
income, it may also covariate with the monthly income. Given that it is well beyond human 
manipulation and is largely randomly assigned, it is not influenced by one’s family values and 
thus is clear of the endogeneity “contamination.” Correspondingly, if we can obtain a significant 
association between gender of the first child and monthly income, we are then establishing a 
causal relationship between whether having more than one child and monthly income.       
 Specifically, we can obtain the first component in (3) by estimating the model (also 
called the first stage model): 





     (4)  
 Then the IV estimate is given by the ratio of the reduced form estimate in (1) (also called 











     (5) 
Based on this estimation procedure, assuming that gender of the first child is well 
randomly assigned, we can then purge X of the selection bias, and get a causal estimate of the 






Instrumental variable: Gender of the first child. This is a binary variable with 0=male, and 
1=female. Since gender of the first-born child is relatively randomly assigned, and also because 
it is highly correlated with the tendency to have more children based on the exemption policy, 
we consider this as a good candidate for an instrumental variable. 
 
Endogenous independent variables: Fertility level. In order to fully capture the fertility effects, 
we utilize two different measures of fertility level, one binary and the other continuous. 
Specifically: 
 Whether having more than one child: This is a binary variable with 0=only having one 
child and 1=having more than one child. 
 Number of children: This is a continuous variable indicating the number of children. 
 
Outcome variables: We have three domains of outcome variables. Aside from the conventionally 
focused income and labor force participation outcome, we also include time allocated to take 
care of the family members, as well as the subjective well-being outcome. Specifically, we have 
examined the fertility effects on the following outcome variables: 
Time use variables: we have used two time use variables, hours worked per month in 
2009 and hours taking care of the family members last month. To make the measure of labor 
force participation more reliable, we generated the first variable by multiplying hours worked per 
day in 2009 and days worked per month in 2009. Since this variable largely varies across 
individuals, when conducting analysis, we use its logged form. To obtain a more general 




taking care of the family members both during weekdays and over the weekend, for the latest 
past month. To make this variable comparable in scale to the labor force participation variable, 
we multiply the weekly estimate by four and take its natural logarithm in the analysis. 
Income variable: personal income last month. Since income has large variation across 
individuals in the sample, we use its logged form in the analysis. 
Subjective well-being variable: this is a composite scale based on the average of six 
subjective ratings ranging from 1 to 5, the higher the number, the more positive the rating is. 
Specifically, the six ratings are: self-rated happiness, life satisfaction, self-confidence in career, 
self-confidence in the future, self-rated quality of social relationship and self-rated social ability. 
 
Control variables: to control for the observed heterogeneity that may influence both the 
independent variables and the dependent variables, we include a rich set of control variables, 
which specifically are, whether working in an agricultural industry (0=no, 1=yes), whether a 
migrant (0=no, 1=yes), age, age at first birth, education, age gap between the oldest child and the 
youngest child, whether living together with the youngest child (0=no, 1=yes), whether living 
together with the spouse (0=no, 1=yes), whether living together with the child(ren)’s grandfather 
(0=no, 1=yes) and whether living together with the child(ren)’s grandmother (0=no, 1=yes). 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Validity of the instrumental variable 




Table 4.1 shows differences in means by gender of the first child for both the two endogenous 
fertility variables and the outcome variables, separately for fathers and mothers. While the 
difference in means for the outcome variables is the Π1 in Equation (5), which indicates the 
reduced form parameter, the difference in means for the fertility variables is the θ1 in Equation 
(5), which indicates the strength of the correlation between the instrumental variable and the 
endogenous fertility variables. As can be seen, for both fathers and mothers, and for both 
endogenous fertility variables, θ1 remains significantly positive. This indicates that gender of the 
first child is a highly valid and powerful instrument for both variables of whether having more 
than one child and of number of children. As for Π1, for fathers, it shows that having more 
children may introduce a positive reduced form fertility effect on working hours, and for mothers, 
having more children may bring them better subjective well-being. By taking the ratio of Π1 over 
θ1, we get the Wald estimates as shown in Table 4.3, which presents the causal estimates of the 
fertility effects without any control variables. 
[Table 4.2 about here] 
 Table 4.2 shows comparable results to those in Table 4.1, except that they are estimated 
with the control variables. Accordingly, ratios of Π1 over θ1 in this table are the 2SLS estimates 
of the fertility effects presented in Table 4.4. As can be seen, θ1 still remains significantly 
positive for all the combinations, again showing the validity of the instrument. However, in this 
more complicated version of the models, fathers with more children do not only work more 
hours per month, they also spend significantly less time taking care of the family members. 




other hand, remain subjectively better off with more children, while not being influenced by 
fertility in both time use and income outcomes.  
To maximally ensure the validity of the 2SLS IV estimates, in Appendix Table 4.2, we 
present a check of balance of the control variables across values of the instrumental variable. As 
can be seen, most differences in means by gender of the first child for the control variables are 
insignificant. This shows that, not only is the instrumental variable exogenous to the outcome 
variables, it is also highly exogenous to other independent variables included in the full model. 
This further demonstrates the unbiasedness of the 2SLS IV estimates.  
 
4.4.2 Fatherhood premium? 
[Table 4.3 about here] 
[Table 4.4 about here] 
Tables 4.3-a and 4.4-a show the fertility effects for fathers, without and with control variables. 
As aforementioned, they are respectively called the Wald estimates and the 2SLS estimates. As 
can be predicted by the results in Table 4.1-a and Table 4.2, based on both endogenous variables, 
with more children, fathers tend to work for more hours per month while spending fewer hours 
per month taking care of the family members. For number of children, fathers report marginally 
significant gain in subjective well-being. However, there seem to be no significant result for the 
logged personal income last month. Note that results in Table 4.3-a have the same directions as 
those in Table 4.4-a, whereas with lower significance levels. Specifically, only coefficients on 
the logged hours worked per month are significant in Table 4.3-a, where we do not introduce any 




even if there is hardly any association between the instrument and the control variables, as shown 
by Appendix Table 4.2, controlling for those exogenous covariates can lead to more precise 
estimates. 
Among all the significant 2SLS results in Table 4.4-a, their OLS counterparts are of the 
same direction, though with lower significance levels. For the logged personal income last month, 
though neither the OLS nor the 2SLS results are insignificant, we can notice that the 2SLS 
results and the OLS results are of opposite directions for both of the endogenous independent 
variables. All these differences indicate the necessity to apply the IV approach in estimating the 
fertility effects, compared to the regular OLS analysis. Also note that the only significant 
coefficients by the Wald estimation in Table 4.3-a have the opposite directions to those by OLS 
estimation. This further shows the importance of controlling for other exogenous covariates in 
the IV estimation. 
 
4.4.3 Motherhood penalty? 
Tables 4.3-b and 4.4-b presents the fertility effects for mothers, respectively by Wald estimates 
and 2SLS estimates. Consistent with the estimated Π1 and θ1 shown in Table 4.1-b and Table 4.2, 
with more children, mothers tend to fare significantly better in subjective well-being. However, 
there seem to be no significant fertility effects on both time use outcomes and logged personal 
income last month. Again, note that those causal coefficients in Table 4.3-b are of lower 
significance levels than those in Table 4.4-b, showing the importance of controlling for 




For the significant 2SLS results on subjective well-being in Tables 4.3-b and 4.4-b, their 
OLS counterparts are either of the opposite directions or of the insignificant same directions. 
Note that for the fertility effect on the logged hours worked per month in Table 4.4-b, though 
both insignificant, the 2SLS results and the OLS results are of opposite directions. Comparing 
across gender, for this outcome, while the 2SLS results are negative for mothers, they are 
positive for fathers, which may indicate a remaining trace of the within-household specialization. 
These discrepancies between the OLS results and 2SLS results for mothers again indicate the 
necessity to apply the IV approach in estimating the fertility effects. 
 
4.5 Conclusions and discussion 
This paper contributes to the established field of “motherhood penalty” and “fatherhood 
premium” both theoretically and methodologically. From the theoretical perspective, China is a 
country with fast and tremendous social changes, one of which within the family sphere is the 
weakened norms of division of labor within the households. Hence, with the up-to-date and 
nationally representative dataset from 2010 CFPS, this paper demonstrates how the influence of 
fertility on various individual behaviors may be framed by the unique social context in 
contemporary China. From the methodological perspective, the differential implementations of 
the “one-child policy” based on gender of the first child constitute as an ideal setting to make an 
IV estimation of the causal effects of fertility on a variety of outcomes. 
Concretely, we examine the gender-specific effects of fertility on the parents’ time use, 
income and subjective well-being based on the IV approach, using the 2010 CFPS. While we 




well-being outcomes. Specifically, with more children, fathers tend to work for more hours per 
month while spending less time taking care of the family members. They also report marginally 
significant gain in subjective well-being. For mothers, it seems having more children does not 
benefit them objectively in terms of both time use and income. However, based on both of the 
endogenous fertility variables, having more children brings mothers significantly better 
subjective well-being. To sum up, based on our IV estimation of the causal effects of fertility, we 
find premiums for both fathers and mothers and penalty for neither of them. 
Yet, we are aware of the limitations of this paper and they can work as future directions 
of studies on the topic. First, it is possible that in those areas with a combination of various 
conditions of the exemption policy, the actual instrument may be more than the gender of the 
first child. Also, the exemption policy may not be strictly implemented in all areas. However, 
considering the robust predicting power of the instrumental variable shown by the results, as well 
as the consistent results by utilizing samples based on different restrictions, we do not see this as 
a severe problem. Second, although we do not think this will invalidate our study, it is still 
worthwhile to discuss whether gender of the first child is randomly assigned, given the 
increasing prevalence of the sex-selective abortions. Sex-selective abortion has mainly been 
enabled by the prenatal sex detection technology, which was not available in remote rural areas 
until the late-1980s (Chu, 2001). That is to say, the randomness of gender of the first birth may 
be influenced for parents covered in our analysis. However, given that the gender distribution of 
the first-born child in our sample is roughly even,19 and that gender of the first birth and the 
                                                            
19 In the unrestricted sample (N=14,166), 48.36% of the first-born children are female; in the analytical sample used 
in this paper (N=1,992), 49.65% of the first-born children are female; in the analytical sample of fathers used in this 
paper (N=1,124), 49.64% of the first-born children are female; in the analytical sample of mothers used in this paper 




tendency to have more than one child are consistently and strongly correlated, we do not think 
this issue will invalidate the results. Third, since the analyses are conducted on a sample with a 
predominant proportion of rural population, the outcome variables may not be well relevant. This 
might be the reason why the income variable is insignificant for both fathers and mothers. Fourth, 
due to the long list of restrictions, we are left with a small sample size. In the future, given more 
sufficient data, more reliable results should be in order. Finally, we may notice the vagueness in 
the implications of the time use outcomes, that is, it is controversial whether spending more time 
working and less time taking care of the family members should be regarded as a premium. In 
this paper, we make this assumption for the consistency and convenience of discussion. 
 This study has contributed to the literature of marriage and family, gender inequality, 
causal inference and contemporary Chinese studies. It has examined the fertility effects on a rich 
set of outcomes including time use, income, and subjective well-being in a research setting of 
tremendous social change in gender inequality. Not only that, it has also facilitated a causal 
estimation by evaluating the fertility effects through the IV approach, based on China’s unique 
exemption policies in family planning. The abovementioned limitations will serve as good 
starting points for the future development of research on this topic.  
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Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.e.
Fertility Variables
More than one child (ref.=one child) 0.49 0.50 0.70 0.46 0.21 *** 0.03
Number of children 1.55 0.61 1.91 0.79 0.36 *** 0.04
Outcome Variables
Time Use Outcomes
Logged hours worked per month in 2009 5.18 0.82 5.29 0.54 0.11 ** 0.04
Logged hours taking care of family members last month -0.21 4.01 -0.33 4.00 -0.12 0.24
Income Outcomes
Logged personal income last month 4.09 5.43 4.44 5.22 0.35 0.32
Subjective Outcomes
Overall subjective scale 3.79 0.66 3.83 0.66 0.05 0.04
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.e.
Fertility Variables
More than one child (ref.=one child) 0.51 0.50 0.73 0.45 0.22 *** 0.03
Number of children 1.56 0.59 1.94 0.80 0.39 *** 0.05
Outcome Variables
Time Use Outcomes
Logged hours worked per month in 2009 5.04 0.86 5.00 0.94 -0.04 0.06
Logged hours taking care of family members last month 1.06 3.97 1.21 3.94 0.16 0.27
Income Outcomes
Logged personal income last month 1.37 5.79 0.94 5.74 -0.43 0.39
Subjective Outcomes
Overall subjective scale 3.77 0.62 3.86 0.65 0.09 * 0.04
Note: 2010 CFPS. The sample is restricted to rural registration, Han ethnicity, eligible provinces with rural registration exemption and 
eligible cases for all the varibles. Overall subjective scale is the average of six subjective scales ranging from 1 to 5 on overall 
happiness, life satisfacation, self-confidence in career, self-confidence in the future, quality of social relationship, and social ability. 
Larger numbers indicate more positive ratings.  †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Gender of the First Child
Male (N =566) Female (N =558)
Table 4.1-a. Difference in Means for Fertility and Outcome Variables, Father Sample
Variables
Difference in      
(Female Minus Male)
Table 4.1-b. Difference in Means for Outcome Variables, Mother Sample
Variables
Gender of the First Child Difference in      
(Male Minus Female)Male (N =437) Female (N =431)
Note: 2010 CFPS. The sample is restricted to rural registration, Han ethnicity, eligible provinces with rural registration exemption and 
eligible cases for all the varibles. Overall subjective scale is the average of six subjective scales ranging from 1 to 5 on overall 
happiness, life satisfacation, self-confidence in career, self-confidence in the future, quality of social relationship, and social ability. 






Stage 1: Fertility Variables
More than one child (ref.=one child) 0.12 *** 0.11 ***
(0.02) (0.02)
Number of children 0.23 *** 0.24 ***
(0.03) (0.03)
Stage 2: Outcome Variables
Time Use Outcomes
Logged hours worked per month in 2009 0.11 ** -0.01
(0.04) (0.06)
Logged hours taking care of family members last month -0.46 * -0.38
(0.23) (0.24)
Income Outcome
Logged personal income last month 0.37 -0.22
(0.28) (0.30)
Subjective Outcome
Overall subjective scale 0.07 † 0.12 **
(0.04) (0.04)
Note: 2010 CFPS. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The sample is restricted to rural registration, 
Han ethnicity, eligible provinces with rural registration exemption and eligible cases for all the varibles. Overall 
subjective scale is the average of six subjective scales ranging from 1 to 5 on overall happiness, life satisfacation, 
self-confidence in career, self-confidence in the future, quality of social relationship, and social ability. Larger 
numbers indicate more positive ratings. All models are estimated with control variables described in Appendix 
Table 4.2.    †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Table 4.2. OLS Estimates of Fertility (Stage 1) and Outcome (Stage 2) Equations
Dependent Variables
Gender of the First Child (ref.=male)








More than one child
-0.07 -0.09 -1.26 *** -0.08 *
(0.04) (0.24) (0.32) (0.04)
0.53 * -0.55 1.63 0.22
(0.21) (1.11) (1.52) (0.19)
Number of children
-0.04 0.01 -0.75 ** -0.05 †
(0.03) (0.16) (0.22) (0.03)
0.31 * -0.33 0.97 0.13
(0.12) (0.66) (0.90) (0.11)
Estimation methods
More than one child
-0.07 0.70 * -2.39 *** -0.18 ***
(0.06) (0.27) (0.39) (0.04)
-0.18 0.71 -1.97 0.40 †
(0.28) (1.23) (1.76) (0.21)
Number of children
-0.04 0.47 * -1.34 *** -0.11 ***
(0.04) (0.18) (0.27) (0.03)
-0.10 0.40 -1.10 0.22 †








Time Use Outcomes Income Outcome Subjective Outcome
Logged hours 
worked per month 
in 2009
Logged hours taking 







Note: 2010 CFPS. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The sample is restricted to rural registration, Han ethnicity, eligible 
provinces with rural registration exemption and eligible cases for all the varibles. Overall subjective scale is the average of six 
subjective scales ranging from 1 to 5 on overall happiness, life satisfacation, self-confidence in career, self-confidence in the future, 
quality of social relationship, and social ability. Larger numbers indicate more positive ratings. All models are estimated without any 






Note: 2010 CFPS. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The sample is restricted to rural registration, Han ethnicity, eligible 
provinces with rural registration exemption and eligible cases for all the varibles. Overall subjective scale is the average of six 
subjective scales ranging from 1 to 5 on overall happiness, life satisfacation, self-confidence in career, self-confidence in the future, 
quality of social relationship, and social ability. Larger numbers indicate more positive ratings. All models are estimated without any 
control variables.  †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Table 4.3-b. OLS and Wald Estimates of Outcome Models, Mother Sample




Time Use Outcomes Income Outcome Subjective Outcome
Logged hours 
worked per month 
in 2009
Logged hours taking 







More than one child
0.002 -0.16 -0.37 -0.01
(0.06) (0.36) (0.44) (0.06)
0.94 * -3.87 † 3.09 0.57
(0.38) (2.03) (2.46) (0.34)
Number of children
0.02 0.05 -0.19 0.03
(0.04) (0.23) (0.28) (0.04)
0.48 * -1.97 † 1.57 0.29 †
(0.19) (1.02) (1.24) (0.17)
Estimation methods
More than one child
0.09 0.16 -0.41 -0.03
(0.09) (0.39) (0.48) (0.07)
-0.11 -3.37 -1.96 1.02 *
(0.50) (2.17) (2.71) (0.42)
Number of children
0.06 0.03 0.05 0.02
(0.06) (0.24) (0.30) (0.04)
-0.05 -1.58 -0.92 0.48 *





worked per month 
in 2009
Logged hours taking 











Time Use Outcomes Income Outcome
Dependent variables
Time Use Outcomes Income Outcome Subjective Outcome
Logged hours 
worked per month 
in 2009
Logged hours taking 







Note: 2010 CFPS. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The sample is restricted to rural registration, Han ethnicity, eligible 
provinces with rural registration exemption and eligible cases for all the varibles. Overall subjective scale is the average of six 
subjective scales ranging from 1 to 5 on overall happiness, life satisfacation, self-confidence in career, self-confidence in the future, 
quality of social relationship, and social ability. Larger numbers indicate more positive ratings. All models are estimated with control 
variables described in Appendix Table 4.2.  †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Note: 2010 CFPS. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. The sample is restricted to rural registration, Han ethnicity, eligible 
provinces with rural registration exemption and eligible cases for all the varibles. Overall subjective scale is the average of six 
subjective scales ranging from 1 to 5 on overall happiness, life satisfacation, self-confidence in career, self-confidence in the future, 
quality of social relationship, and social ability. Larger numbers indicate more positive ratings. All models are estimated with control 
variables described in Appendix Table 4.2.  †p<0.10; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Father (N =1,124)
Mother (N =868)
Table 4.4-a. OLS and 2SLS Estimates of Outcome Models, Father Sample








The parents live in mountain area, rural 
residents, one girl only
Beijing; Tianjin; Shanxi; Inner Mongol; Jilin; 
Heilongjiang; Zhejiang; Anhui; Fujian; Jiangxi; 
Henan; Hubei; Hunan; Guangdong; Chongqing; 
Guizhou; Shannxi; Gansu.
The parents work in mining industry and 
directly work in mines, one girl only
Hebei; Jiangsu; Zhengjiang; Anhui; Shandong; 
Henan.
Mother rural, one girl only Guangxi.
Mother rural, one girl only and with rural 
registration  
Liaoning; Shandong.
Mother rural, one girl only, father living with his 
parents-in-law, mother without brothers
Jiangsu.
Mother rural, one girl only, father without 
brothers and with only one sister
Jiangsu.
Mother rural, one girl only, spouse living in 
coastal farming areas
Jiangsu.
Mother rural, one girl only, one of the spouse in 
marine fishing
Jiangsu.
Both parents rural, one of the spouse having 
non-heritable physical disability, one girl only
Jiangsu.
One of the parents works as contract worker in 
farming industry, one girl only
Jilin.
One of the parents works in marine fishing 
industry, one girl only
Shandong.
One of the parents has non-heritable physical 
disability, one girl only
Shandong.
Appendix Table 4.1. Exemptions Policy to Have a Second Child with One Girl
















Age at first birth 0.508 ** 0.043
(0.195) (0.205)
Illiterate or semi illiterate 0.041 * 0.029
(0.020) (0.030)
Primary -0.058 * -0.002
(0.027) (0.032)
Junior middle 0.023 -0.028
(0.030) (0.031)
Senior middle -0.007 0.003
(0.018) (0.017)
Associate college or above 0.002 -0.002
(0.010) (0.011)
1.250 *** 1.390 ***
(0.209) (0.240)
Youngest child coresidence 0.007 0.002
(0.008) (0.011)
Spouse coresidence 0.004 0.002
(0.004) (0.009)
Grandfather coresidence -0.024 -0.020
(0.028) (0.013)
Grandmother coresidence -0.001 -0.013
(0.029) (0.014)
Appendix Table 4.2. Differences in Means for Control Variables
Note: 2010 CFPS. Standard errors are reported in the 
parentheses. The sample is restricted to rural registration, Han 
ethnicity, eligible provinces with rural registration exemption 
and eligible cases for all the varibles. Province of the 
respondent's residential registration is also controlled for as a 
set of dummy variables to single out the regional fixed effect. P-
value of Pearson's Chi-square test for association between 
gender of the first child and province of residential registration 
is 0.513 for fathers, and 0.764 for mothers.  †p<0.10; *p<0.05; 
**p<0.01; ***p<0.001.
Age gap between the oldest 





Difference in means by gender 










Contemporary China has experienced dramatic economic, social and demographic changes, 
especially after the start of its economic reforms in the late 1970s (Xie and Hannum, 1996; Xie et 
al., 2013). Among the changes, the increasing prevalence of gender equality had been one of the 
most salient (Hannum, 2005; Meisner, 1999; Parish, 1981; Whyte, 2010), and women’s status 
both within and outside the household had been improved tremendously (Mauer-Fazio et al., 
1999; Treiman, 2013; Wu and Song, 2010; Zuo and Bian, 2001). Specifically, women’s 
educational level started to catch up with that of men (Treiman, 2013; Wu and Zhang, 2010), 
women have been actively participated in labor force (Wu and Song, 2010; Lavely et al., 1990), 
and the within-household specialization had been greatly weakened (Bian et al., 2000; Whyte 
and Parish, 1984; Wolf, 1984; Zuo and Bian, 2001). 
 However, note that China has long been a patriarchal and patrilineal society (Thornton 
and Lin, 1994; Whyte, 2003). Therefore, when the economic reform had been implemented more 
deeply and more thoroughly, an increasing focus on short-term efficiency had disproportionately 
disadvantaged the labor market conditions for women (Lavely et al., 1990). Moreover, 
considering China’ gigantic population and its relatively limited resources per capita, economic 
reform has brought about fierce market competition and unparalleled economic pressures for 




household establishments, some married women may begin to go back to their roles of 
homemakers and some single women may aim for stronger economic potentials in men during 
the process of mate selection (Yu and Xie, 2013). That is, China’s unique social dynamics may 
have made the same process of economic reform produce different, or even opposite social 
forces.  
 This resumed “patriarchy” is reflected in the results from both Chapters 2 and 4. 
Specifically, in Chapter 2, the results imply that women have resumed their predominant 
enthusiasm to marry men who are more economically established and thus usually older, which 
leads to a reversal of the increasing trend in age homogamy during the post-1990 reform era. In 
Chapter 4, we find that only fathers are working for more hours and spending less time taking 
care of family members when having more children, which may constitute as evidence for the 
remaining or resumed within-household specialization. 
In addition to those consequences due to the temporal changes in contemporary China, its 
regional heterogeneities have also uniquely shaped individuals’ marriage and family behaviors. 
Chapter 3 provides us with such a case. Specifically, this chapter examines how marital 
behaviors of Hui Muslims respond to varying conditions of local ethnic marriage markets. 
Results show that in places with higher Hui concentrations, Hui tend to have higher marriage 
rates, marry earlier and marry more endogamously. Conditional on being married, the logged 
odds of exogamy over endogamy is significantly lower in places with higher Hui concentrations; 
nevertheless, if we put exogamy as an alternative to being single, coefficient on the logged odds 
of exogamy over singleness is only significantly negative for women. This indicates the 




while men are more responsive to the change in Hui concentrations, women are constrained 
more strictly by the norm of universal marriage than men on a global basis. Men and women are 
equally restricted by the norm of endogamy.  
This dissertation contributes toward understanding of the contextual influences, temporal 
or regional, on individuals’ marriage and family behaviors, under a dynamic research setting. 
Future directions for this line of research point toward the incorporation of theories which 
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